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ABSTRACT 
 
There has been considerable debate within the literature between those who 
view recognition as the result of two processes (recollection and familiarity) and those 
who consider that familiarity is all that is required. Within those models that propose 
a role for recollection, the dominant view is that recollection involves recalling 
qualitative content from the study episode and thus is thought to be responsible for 
tasks that require episodic memory such as list discrimination tasks. Familiarity is not 
generally thought to be helpful in identifying source although it may be correlated 
with it. Eluding the debate between a single and dual process interpretation, I instead 
propose that a role for content is likely for some tasks, but not necessarily for all 
episodic tasks. 
In this thesis, the necessity of recalling qualitative information in order to 
adequately perform an episodic recognition task was examined across seven 
experiments. In order to properly address this question it was necessary that the 
methodology inhibited the use of content in distinguishing between episodes. All 
experiments contained the same basic design where participants receive multiple 
study and test lists constructed of the same items. In this list-specific design, the same 
words are tested on each list, however the targets and distracters are randomized on 
every list. In consequence all items become more familiar and recollected content 
becomes less useful with each successive list. Despite the difficulty of the task and the 
reduction in the availability of discriminating content, across all experiments it was 
found that most participants were still able to perform the task.  
The Remember-Know (RK) procedure has often been applied in order to 
ascertain the involvement of recollection and familiarity in recognition tasks, however 
there has been a fair amount of controversy regarding the validity of the RK 
procedure. Despite the controversy the procedure is still frequently used. Including 
RK judgments allowed some assessment of whether content could still be useful in a 
list specific task. In addition, I was able to evaluate how the addition of the RK 
procedure might affect recognition performance. 
All three experiments incorporated in the second chapter demonstrated that 
participants could adequately perform the list specific task. Some large differences in 
recognition performance were observed when RK judgments were included for the 
first time on the final list compared to conditions where participants were well 
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practiced at the task or were yet to make RK decisions. However it was difficult to 
form strong conclusions from the data due to limitations of the design. It was further 
difficult to make strong conclusions about whether or not content was still useful to 
participants, because despite some very poor performance with the inclusion of the 
RK task on the final list, participants were still more likely to attribute R judgments to 
hits than false alarms. 
In the third chapter the methodology of the initial experiments was refined.  
From the results of the experiments in this chapter I was able to more categorically 
conclude that the inclusion of the RK paradigm can alter recognition and sometimes R 
judgments. I was also able to more accurately measure the contribution of recollection 
to the task. In the last experiment in this chapter I included a justification condition 
where participants were asked to write down the content they had recollected. This 
manipulation greatly reduced the likelihood that participants would produce a R 
judgment and also adversely affected recognition performance. In addition, while R 
judgments were still frequently accurate (more often made to hits than false alarms), a 
chi square analysis which tests for an association between R judgments and hits, 
failed to indicate that content could have been useful for the majority of participants. 
However, there was some indication that participants were more capable of 
associating hits and R judgments when they were more practiced at the RK procedure.  
The final experiment, included in chapter 4, supported previous findings and 
also provided further clarification as to how RK judgments might be affecting 
recognition. It was possible that knowledge about a role for familiarity and 
recollection in recognition memory might be enough to alter performance on the 
recognition task. It was also possible that actively making RK judgments affected the 
task. The results of the final experiment indicated more strongly that actively making 
RK judgments as participants perform the recognition task, could adversely affect 
recognition performance. Implications for the RK paradigm are discussed, as are 
implications for the role of content recollection in recognition memory and episodic 
memory.  	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CHAPTER 1 	  
Literature Review 
Episodic Memory and Autonoesis 
Episodic memory has accumulated a large number of defining features since 
its conception. It has been defined broadly as the memory for past experience and 
more specifically it is considered to be more recent to evolve, late to develop and easy 
to deteriorate (Tulving and Szpunar, 2009). The most distinguishing feature remains 
Tulving’s (1983) assertion that a special type of phenomenological experience termed 
‘autonoetic consciousness’ or ‘self-knowing’ accompanied episodic memory. It is 
thought that the experience of recalling information about the time and place of the 
event results in autonoetic awareness. This type of conscious awareness has been 
contrasted to the type of awareness experienced during semantic retrieval. Recalling 
from semantic memory, for example recalling that Paris is the capital of France, does 
not elicit autonoetic awareness. Instead, the type of awareness thought to accompany 
semantic retrieval has been described as ‘noetic’ or simply ‘knowing’ (Tulving, 
1983).  
As a key characteristic of his theory it was unavoidable that consciousness 
would have to be in some way quantified. To this end, Tulving (1985) tested his 
theory by collecting subjective reports from participants on whether their state of 
awareness at retrieval was best characterized by a remember (R) or a know (K) 
judgment. In order to allow participants to distinguish between different states of 
awareness, Tulving (1985) indicated that a R judgment should be made if qualitative 
detail of the study event was recalled (i.e., such as a thought or feeling one 
experienced at the time of study). In comparison, a K judgment should be made when 
memory of the event was not accompanied by any details of the episode and rather 
should be made when the participant simply felt that they knew they had studied the 
item. Therefore, a R judgment was only to be made when episodic content was 
recalled and consequently should reflect episodic memory, while a K judgment 
should reflect an absence of such detail and therefore should reflect semantic memory 
and noetic consciousness.  
Tulving (1983) introduced the synergistic ecphory model of recall and 
recognition. Ecphoric information was defined as an amalgam of episodic and 
semantic information, which could then determine the nature of the recollective 
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experience. Within this model different memories could be formed depending on 
whether there was more episodic information or more semantic information available. 
Tulving (1985) postulated that if there was more episodic trace information then the 
recollective experience will mostly be characterised by autonoetic consciousness 
(eliciting a R response), whereas when there was more semantic cue information then 
the recollective experience would mostly be characterised by noetic consciousness 
(eliciting a K response).  
In his first experiment, Tulving (1985) varied ecphoric information across 
three successive tests after participants studied a list of category names and single 
category instances (e.g., musical instrument – viola). The first test was a free recall 
task. The second test provided category cues for items that had not been recalled on 
the first test. Similarly, any remaining to-be-remembered items from the second test 
were then tested on the third test, which provided the category cue and also the initial 
letter of the target item. The first test was described as having relatively rich episodic 
trace information combined with relatively impoverished (semantic) retrieval 
information. Whereas by the final test, there was abundant retrieval information 
combined with relatively poor trace information. Tulving (1985) found that the 
proportion of R judgments reflected the changes in episodic (trace) information across 
tasks.	    
In the second experiment of Tulving’s (1985) paper RK judgments were 
collected from participants in two recognition tests. The retention interval varied 
between groups such that one group studied and were tested on a list of 36 words on 
the same day and another group studied the same list on day 1 however their memory 
for the items was not tested until 7 days later on day 8. The hit rates decreased and the 
false alarm rate increased over the 7-day retention interval. The proportion of R 
judgments for correctly recognized words was lower on day 8 than on day 1. It was 
concluded that autonoetic awareness was more clearly present in the recollection of 
recently encountered events than in that of events encountered a week earlier. 
The distinction Tulving (1983) made in terms of consciousness was intuitive 
as most people can discriminate between the experiences of recalling a self-
experienced event and recalling from general knowledge. However in response to 
Tulving’s (1984) paper, Klatzky (1984) commented that there were some difficulties 
with providing experimental evidence for separate systems, especially when based on 
differing phenomenological experience. Klatzky (1984) indicated that a distinction 
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could be made between semantic and episodic knowledge. That is a simple content 
distinction can be made between information relating to ‘what, when and where’ 
(www) and other information. Klatzky (1984) pointed out that different 
phenomenological experience was not necessarily an indication of separate systems 
but rather a difference in awareness occurring due to the retrieval of two different 
types of information. While not explicitly acknowledged in the literature, the content 
distinction pointed out by Klatzky (1984) has often been relied upon in order to 
differentiate between episodic and semantic memory. 
A simple content distinction as outlined by Klatzky (1984) can be applied to 
the thoroughly documented case of the amnesic K.C who could recall general self-
knowledge however he could not recall a single self experienced episode. While K.C 
was aware that his family owned a holiday house, he could not remember one single 
instance of actually being there, despite many visits in the past (Tulving, 2005). Thus 
K.C could not recall information relating to www, however he could report other 
information from general knowledge. On the basis of this it was concluded that K.C 
did not possess autonoetic awareness and therefore that he did not possess episodic 
memory. The assumption implied in this conclusion was that recollection of content 
was indicative of the memory for a particular episode, and that a memory for a 
particular episode can only occur if content is recollected. 
A distinction was eventually made between episodic knowledge and 
autonoetic awareness (Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007). Specifically, a distinction is 
made between knowing www and remembering www. Thus in order to possess 
episodic memory one had to mentally relive the event, not just possess episodic 
knowledge. Due to this distinction, scrub-jays, a food-caching bird, that can provide 
evidence for knowledge of www can only be deemed as having episodic-like memory 
(Clayton, Yu and Dickenson, 2001). That is, their behaviour may indicate they 
possess knowledge of an episode, but it can not be concluded that they have 
experienced autonoesis. In addition, while children under the age of four can retain 
knowledge they seem to be without the capacity to recall the event that provided them 
with that knowledge (Wimmer, Hogrefe and Perner, 1988). That is, three year olds 
can tell what they know but rarely can indicate the source of that knowledge, or why 
they know what they know (Wimmer et al., 1988; Perner & Ruffman, 1995; Perner, 
Kloo, & Gornik, 2007). The proposed distinction between episodic knowledge and 
episodic memory proposes that contents recalled may not necessarily relate to a 
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particular episode, however to the best of my knowledge, this premise has not been 
explicitly tested within traditional laboratory based memory experiments. 
Recollection and Content in Recognition Memory 
The initial content distinction Tulving (1985) made between episodic and 
semantic memory had a lasting influence on the way in which recollection is more 
often conceptualized, particularly within the recognition literature. Some theories 
propose that recognition involves the use of two underlying processes, familiarity and 
recollection. As the following section will illustrate, where a role for recollection is 
proposed, it is often assumed to involve the recollection of qualitative content from 
the study episode. Theories differ on how recollection is defined and some are more 
heavily influenced by Tulving’s theory of episodic memory than others. The next 
section reviews these different opinions with the aim of illustrating that the content 
distinction Tulving (1985) initially made can be applied to some current theories of 
recognition memory.  
The idea that recognition might require some form of recall/recollection and 
also some sort of familiarity has been in the literature for quite some time (i.e.. 
Atkinson and Juola, 1974; Mandler, 1968; 1980, Humphreys 1976; 1978, Rabinowitz, 
Mandler and Barsalou, 1977). Across these earlier theories familiarity and 
recall/recollection have had varied definitions, for example, Rabinowitz et al., (1977) 
proposed the idea of a perceptual code and conceptual code, roughly synonymous 
with ideas of familiarity and recall respectively. Humphreys (1976, 1978) drew a 
distinction between item and relational information, also roughly synonymous with 
ideas of familiarity and recall. Earlier models made reference to simply recalling the 
item, however more current theories often consider recollection as the retrieval of 
qualitative aspects of the study episode, which is more congruent with Tulving’s 
(1983) theory of episodic memory.  
At this point, a distinction can be made between recall and recollection. That 
is between simply recalling the item or recollecting aspects of the study experience. 
The distinction I make between recall and recollection has often been either 
obfuscated or overlooked in the literature. For example, while Mandler (1980) 
focused on a role for recall and familiarity in recognition, as more popularly 
evidenced by his ‘butcher on the bus’ example, he remained ambiguous about 
whether recall referred to recollected content, the recall of the to-be-recognized item 
as had been implied in earlier models, or the act of recalling something. In order to 
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distinguish from earlier ideas about recall or any other definition, when recollection is 
viewed solely through the type of content retrieved, I will use the term content 
recollection. 
There are a number of current approaches that consider that recollection and 
familiarity are required for recognition decisions (i.e., Jacoby, 1991; Yonelinas 1994; 
The source of activation confusion (SAC) model: Reder, Nhouyvanisvong, Schunn, 
Ayers, Angstadt & Hiraki, 2000). Wixted and Stretch (2004) argue that recollection 
and familiarity combine to produce a single strength signal on which recognition 
decisions are based. The STREAK model (Rotello, Macmillan and Reeder, 2004) also 
views the recognition decision as a reflection of different combinations of recollection 
and familiarity.  Some of these theories have been heavily influenced by Tulving’s 
(1983, 2005) theory of episodic memory. For example, Jacoby (1991) and Yonelinas 
(1994) view recollection as the effortful and accurate retrieval of episodic 
information. However the role of familiarity is far more vague. It is not considered to 
be source specifying, nor be accompanied by any qualitative information as is thought 
to occur during recollection. In sum, differences are outlined in terms of speed, 
accuracy, effort and content. That qualitative information is present for one process 
and not the other has become a fundamental distinguishing feature. Furthermore, 
these models, similar to Tulving’s (1983) theory of episodic memory, assume that 
recollected content is informing the participant about whether or not the test item 
appeared at a certain time and place. 
A clear example of how these latter dual process models view recollection is 
embodied within the process dissociation procedure (PDP) devised by Jacoby (1991). 
The broader purpose of the PDP was to distinguish intentional from automatic 
processes.  Jacoby (1991) also used it to affirm assumptions regarding content 
recollection (intentional) and familiarity (automatic) in a list discrimination task. This 
procedure involves participants studying two lists and then receiving a recognition 
task. In the ‘inclusion’ condition, they are required to respond, “yes” if the item was 
in either of the two lists. In the ‘exclusion’ condition, they are required to respond 
“yes” only if the item appeared in the target list (either list 1 or list 2) and not in the 
non-target list. Jacoby (1991) assumes that, in the inclusion condition, the subject will 
respond yes if the item is familiar or if it is recollected (or both). In the exclusion 
condition, when the subject should be responding no, it is assumed that they will 
mistakenly respond yes if the item is familiar but they fail to recollect which list it 
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occurred in. The PDP relies on a number of assumptions; however the critical 
assumption made with this model that I wish to examine, is that recollected contents 
are informing participants both about the list membership of each item and occurrence 
in the experiment.  
In contrast to ideas about recollection in the PDP and other dual process 
models there are some models that propose that list discrimination tasks, such as those 
employed in the PDP can be accomplished via a process that does not bring content to 
mind. Content may or may not accompany this process, and may or may not be 
useful, but it is not considered to play the important role given to it within the PDP. 
So called single-process models view recognition as a reflection of one source of 
information that varies in strength and can be described by signal detection theory. 
Signal detection theory applied to decision processes in old/new recognition has been 
well established (Green and Swets, 1966). For example, global matching models, 
while differing in specifics, propose a match between a cue or target item and other 
relevant information in memory. The strength of the match is reflected in the 
recognition judgment (e.g., SAM (Gillund and Shiffrin, 1984), REM (Shiffrin and 
Steyvers, 1997), The Matrix Model (Humphreys, Bain and Pike, 1989) and 
BCDMEM (Dennis and Humphreys, 2001). These models provide a possible 
alternative to a dual process understanding of recognition performance.  
There has been substantial debate within the literature regarding how many 
processes underlie recognition memory and as of yet there is no clear consensus. It is 
not my aim to argue for a single or dual process interpretation, but rather to ascertain 
how useful content recollection is in a task that requires the participant to consider 
information pertaining to www. In going about this I consider the common 
methodologies used to measure the presence or absence of content recollection. In 
particular, the following section discusses the use of the RK paradigm in recognition 
memory and in doing so, expands on different conceptualizations of content 
recollection and also how these differences might be reflected in RK judgments. This 
is particularly relevant considering the extensive use of the paradigm to provide 
converging evidence for recollection and familiarity in recognition performance.  
Application of RK Judgments to Recognition Memory 
It was not only Tulving’s (1983) theory of declarative memory that influenced 
ideas about recollection but also his 1985 use of the RK paradigm. Typical 
instructions on a RK task in recognition memory ask participants to indicate their 
	   7	  
recognition decision as R if they recall qualitative aspects about the study episode 
(such as thoughts or reactions they had at the time of study) or K if the item is 
familiar but they cannot recall any content from the study episode. Thus a R response 
is thought to index conscious recollection, while a K response is thought to index the 
feeling of familiarity. The way in which the RK task is interpreted differs depending 
on how recollection and familiarity are conceptualized within a recognition task. 
Those dual process theories that consider a recognition decision to be based on 
a combination of recollection and familiarity, for example Wixted and Stretch (2004) 
and Rotello et al., (2004) also view RK judgments as a reflection of different 
combination of recollection and familiarity. That is, they do not consider that RK 
judgments will reflect a process-pure measure of recollection and familiarity. 
However others, particularly those who consider that recollected content is 
responsible for list discrimination or source identification consider a R judgment at 
least to be a reasonably pure measure of recollection.  
Tulving (2001) notes that the application of the RK paradigm to recognition 
studies have indicated that, as well as episodic recollection, recognition can be 
achieved through familiarity (i.e. Gardiner, 1988; Yonelinas and Jacoby, 1995). In 
general single list recognition tests have been preferred in the literature and Tulving 
(2001) points out that such a test may not necessarily rely on episodic memory, as an 
old decision does not necessitate that the participant know exactly what, when and 
where they had viewed the item. This is due to the fact that more recently viewed 
items will tend to be more familiar and therefore a general feeling of familiarity may 
suffice. While there has been a preference for such single list designs, there are list 
and source discrimination studies that have also utilsed the RK paradigm. 
In Yonelinas and Jacoby (1995) the RK paradigm was applied to the PDP with 
the result that those judgments converged nicely with estimates of recollection and 
familiarity gained form the procedure.  The authors do not propose a process pure 
interepretation of RK judgments as K responses reflect familiarity in the absence of 
recollection (F(1 – R)) (Yonelinas and Jacoby, 1995). However they do expect R to 
be a reliable indicator that recollection has occurred, provided participants are 
responding as the experimenter expects them to. In essence, the assumption made by 
the PDP is that R judgments should reflect the process of recollection even if 
familiarity is also contributing to the R judgment. Therefore, according to the PDP 
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perspective, R judgments are usually only made when content has been recalled and 
therefore should be a reasonable indicator of content recollection.  
The PDP view of content recollection and RK judgments can be contrasted to 
how these processes are viewed in the source monitoring framework (SMF). Source 
memory, such as deciding that the test item had been heard in a male or female voice 
at the time of study, is thought to require the retrieval of source specific information 
which may be considered synonymous to recollected content (i.e., Johnson, 
Hashtroudi and Lindsay, 1993). However the functionality of content recollection as it 
is embodied within the SMF differs somewhat to how it is viewed in episodic 
recognition or dual process models of recognition. Source memory recollection does 
not necessarily need to be accurate or effortful, nor is it seen as independent of any 
strong feeling of familiarity (Qin, Raye, Johnson & Mitchell, 2001).  
An example of how the two theories differ can be observed by comparing 
interpretations of data present in Yonelinas (1999). In his fourth experiment 
participants discriminated between words from two lists that had been presented five 
days apart. The results supported the idea that a continuous process was responsible 
for completion of the memory task, thus, Yonelinas (1999) argues that it was 
familiarity (in the form of recency) that provided a strong cue to source. Qin et al 
(2001) noted however, that such data often results even when familiarity could not be 
used to indicate source. That is, content recollection and familiarity are thought to 
occur continuously within the SMF therefore making a clear distinction between 
familiarity and recollection does not fit with a source monitoring perspective. As 
such, Qin et al (2001) argued that the results Yonelinas (1999) observed were due to 
differences in the qualitative characteristics of memory as memory for source should 
be continuous. While the SMF consider that R judgments should exist on a 
continuum, and therefore is at odds with some dual process views on recollection, 
both consider that content recollection, as reflected by R decisions, should be largely 
responsible for source or list decisions.  
As previously mentioned, there are models commonly referred to as single 
process theories that do not focus on a familiarity/recollection distinction in 
recognition memory. These models also predict that RK judgments like recognition 
judgments are also made on a strength based continuum. As such, these theories 
propose that task difficulty may be all that is required to produce a dissociation in RK 
judgments. For example in Donaldson’s (1996) account of a recognition task, 
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participants must establish a criterion at which point an item can be labeled ‘old’ and 
all memories that fall beneath this criterion are labeled ‘new’. When making RK 
judgments another criterion is established for R responses and everything that is ‘old’ 
but below this second criterion is identified as a K response. Using Tulving’s (1985) 
recognition experiment as an example this means that after a greater interval between 
study and test, R responses would be affected simply because task difficulty is 
confounded across conditions. Thus as the memory weakens over the longer retention 
interval more items would fall below the R criterion but above the new criterion 
relative to the number that fall above the R criterion.  
It may be that two processes underlie recognition memory and it may be that 
sometimes RK judgments adequately reflect those processes. However there has been 
considerable disagreement in the literature about both of these proposals. The 
following section reviews some attempts to validate a role for content recollection in 
recognition memory and, in doing this, I further explore attempts to validate the RK 
procedure. 
Can RK Data Adequately Reflect Two Distinct Processes? 
There has been some evidence that estimates of recollection and familiarity 
obtained from the RK paradigm, the processes dissociation procedure (PDP) and from 
receiver-operating-characteristic (ROC) curves converge (i.e., Yonelinas and Jacoby, 
1995; Yonelinas, Kroll, Dobbins, Lazzara & Knight, 1998, Arndt and Reder, 2002). 
However Malmberg (2008) has reviewed this literature and has concluded that the 
estimates are not sufficiently similar to support the conclusion that these procedures 
are producing estimates of the same constructs. This does not necessarily indicate that 
content recollection is not involved, but rather that there is not enough convincing 
evidence to categorically conclude that the different procedures are measuring what 
they are meant to measure.  
ROC data in particular has been used along with RK data in order to provide 
converging evidence for either a single or dual process theory of recognition memory. 
To explain, the ROC is based on confidence ratings given by participants in regards to 
a comparative old/new decision. The different levels of confidence are interpreted as 
different criterion settings, so that a high confidence old response corresponds to a 
high, conservative criterion and a high confidence new response to a low liberal one. 
When graphed, the ROC curve is a plot of the proportions of the ratings to hits as a 
function of the proportions of ratings to false alarms. From a dual process point of 
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view of recognition memory, familiarity is thought to produce a curvilinear plot. 
Whereas recollection is thought to represent a threshold retrieval process so that R 
responses are only given to the highest confidence responses (i.e.,Yonelinas, 2001). 
However, the single process view assumes that R and old responses are merely high 
and low confidence recognition decisions, thus a curvilinear ROC in line with signal 
detection theory is predicted for all responses.  
Yonelinas (2001) found that, across three different measurement procedures, 
familiarity was well described by signal detection theory and recollection by a 
threshold process (since R responses were clearly identified with only high 
confidence responses). However, Rotello Macmillan and Reeder (2004) provide 
alternative interpretations for some of this data, their experiments indicated that RK 
responses tended to reflect more graded information. However they did not find 
evidence that this occurred along one continuum as proposed by Donaldson (1996), 
instead according to Rotello et al., (2004), an evaluation of the data led to their 
conclusion that neither the dual process nor single process theories provided an 
adequate fit for the data, instead they came up with an entirely new model (the 
STREAK model). In their review however, Wixted and Stretch (2004) determined 
that when procedures across experiments were controlled ROC and RK data could 
produce similar ROC slopes in line with a signal detection theory account for RK 
judgments. It remains unclear as to which interpretation is superior, however it is 
clear that RK data can produce evidence both for and against each model. While it 
may be that recollection and familiarity were involved with such tasks, it does not 
necessarily follow that the RK task was adequately reflecting those processes. 
Neuroimaging data has further been explored in order to validate RK 
judgments. Different brain regions are thought to be involved, generally such that the 
hippocampus supports recollection, while familiarity is supported through other 
regions, such as the perirhinal cortex (i.e., Yonelinas et al., 1998; Yonelinas, Otten, 
Shaw and Rugg, 2005; Rugg and Yonelinas, 2003; Yonelinas, Kroll, Quamme, 
Lazzara, Suave, Widaman and Knight 2002). Some evidence, using a combination of 
ROC data and RK data has been used to verify this observation. For example, 
Yonelinas  et al., (1998) provided convincing evidence as he found that amnesics with 
hippocampal lesions have a selective detriment to their recollection process, but not 
the familiarity process. However Wais, Wixted, Hopkins and Squire (2006) found that 
amnesics produce similar ROC’s to controls when their memory was strengthened 
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(here amnesics studied ten words for a recognition test whereas controls studied 50 
words). Therefore an entirely conceivable account is that the increased brain activity 
associated with a R response in Yonelinas et al., (1998) reflects a corresponding 
higher level of activity associated with the retrieval of strong memories. In support of 
the idea that the hippocampus may be involved in stronger memories, not necessarily 
as the result of recollection, Wixted and Squire (2010) have shown that high 
confidence K responses activate the hippocampus just as do R responses.  
RK Judgments Vary Depending on Task Attributes 
A further method commonly utilised in order to determine that RK judgments 
reflect different processes is to demonstrate that independent variables have a 
different but interpretable pattern of results on R and K judgments. Dissociations have 
been observed in the literature across a number of variable manipulations. For 
example Reder et al., (2000) found that low frequency words were more likely to be 
accompanied by recollection than familiarity and the opposite was observed for high 
frequency words. Also, Gardiner, Gawlik and Richardson-Klavehn (1994) found that 
recollection supported elaborative rehearsal after a short cue delay in a directed 
forgetting task, while knowing supported maintenance rehearsal after a long cue 
delay. As well as many other examples (i.e., Dobbins, Kroll & Yonelinas, 2004, 
Gardiner and Java, 1990, Gardiner, Gawlik & Richardson-Klavehn, 1994, Rajaram, 
1993, Rajaram 1996, Rajaram 1998, Rajaram and Geraci 2000). However, despite all 
of this evidence, Dunn (2008) reviewed 37 such studies and found that the data was 
also consistent with unequal signal detection theory. Showing that when variation in 
decision criteria is controlled, the two memory components appear to show little 
tendency to vary independently. Therefore it becomes difficult to know if one is really 
dissociating recollection from familiarity or just varying the criterion for RK 
decisions.  
In accordance with dual process logic R responses should not be affected by a 
change in criterion placement, as the conscious state of recollection should be 
independent of other decision processes. However K responses may vary depending 
on decision manipulations. In contrast, a signal detection explanation would predict 
movement for both R and K responses. There was some evidence that a criterion shift 
failed to affect R judgments from Strack and Forster (1995). In their study recognition 
instructions were manipulated to indicate that either 30% of the test list items had 
been studied or 50% (while it was always the case that half the items were old and 
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half were new as in a standard recognition task). In agreement with dual process 
predictions, they found that R responses did not vary with the manipulation however 
K responses did. However, Hirshman and Henzler (1998) found that when the 
manipulation was strengthened such that participants were told that either 30% or 
70% of the test items would be old then R responses did vary. Specifically more R 
and K judgments were made with the less conservative criterion. 
In general manipulating instructions has often led to changes in the way in 
which RK judgments are made and this has further sometimes led to changes in 
recognition performance. For example, Mather, Henkel and Johnson (1997) found 
that instructing participants to give a more detailed examination of recollective detail 
at test resulted in higher recognition accuracy. Specifically RK judgments were 
compared with MCQ (Memory Characteristics Questionnaire; Johnson, Foley, 
Suengas & Raye, 1988) data, which provided a more stringent evaluation of 
recollected content (i.e., questions probed for information across a wide array of 
attributes such as perceptual, semantic and confidence) than the more global RK 
instructions. Mather et al., (1997) noted that this may be because the MCQ condition 
might increase the number of characteristics recalled and therefore more information 
would be available for the participant in order to make an old/new decision.  
 Rotello, Macmillan, Reeder and Wong (2005) found that when more specific 
instructions were given as in Yonelinas (2002) (subjects were told that they might 
need to explain their R judgments to the experimenter) very few R responses to words 
recognized with lower confidence were given. A neutral condition (with instructions 
modeled off Rajaram, 1993) resulted with subjects providing R responses to words 
recognized over a range of confidence levels. Here the instructions produced data 
consistent with either a dual process or single process result. Rotello et al., (2005) 
commented that the Rajaram (1993) instructions are standard and often the 
subsequent data produced from these instructions have actually been consistent with a 
dual process view. In addition, adding a third guess category has been shown to 
change the pattern of RK results (i.e., Gardiner, Richardson-Klavehn & Ramponi, 
1997). That instructions and response measures can change the number of R 
responses is particularly problematic for dual process theories as their 
conceptualization of recollection is that it should not be affected by such 
manipulations.  
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In response to the difficulties noted for a dual process interpretation of RK 
data, Parks and Yonelinas (2007) and Yonelinas, Aly, Wang and Koen (2010) have 
indicated that greater care must be taken with the wording of RK instructions. That is, 
only strict instructions regarding recollection are likely to yield accurate estimates of 
recollection gained through R judgments (in accordance with the Yonelinas (2002) 
results). While this may be true, this may also be yet another way of moving the RK 
criterion without really gaining an accurate measure of recollection and familiarity in 
the process.  
RK and Accuracy 
As outlined previously, it is generally assumed by dual process models that R 
judgments provide an indication that qualitative aspects of the study episode have 
been recalled (Gardiner, 1988: Rajaram, 1993; Yonelinas and Jacoby, 1995). The 
theory initially did not take account of R judgments made to false alarms and they 
were rarely considered within the literature. Yonelinas (2002) treated R-false alarms 
as error and proposed that true recollection may be estimated by substracting R-false 
alarms from R-hits. However, others have viewed R-false alarms as more interesting 
than error that should be removed. For example, Higham and Vokey (2004), had 
participants make R and K judgments without first making a recognition response. 
Under these conditions participants made a large number of R responses to new 
words.  Some have even used the RK paradigm in an effort to further understand false 
memory (i.e., Rodieger and McDermott, 1995; Whittlesea, 2002). A dual process 
view has some trouble accounting for the fact that this research has often found that R 
responses are made to false memories, however other models such as the SMF 
previously mentioned can accommodate false remembering. 
In support of the idea that RK judgments are made along a continuum, K 
judgments have been found to support source accuracy. According to the dual process 
account of recognition memory, K responses should not reflect recollection and 
therefore should not be useful in source identification. Although a R response tends to 
always elicit significantly more source accuracy at test than a K response, K 
judgments still produced source accuracy above chance levels (i.e., Conway and 
Dewhurst, 1995). In addition, Hicks, Marsh and Ritschel (2002) found that a high 
percentage of know judgments were made after an accurate source decision. 
Therefore, while R responses may contain richer source information, a feeling of 
familiarity may still suffice when making source decisions. It should be noted that 
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within these experiments K responses could not be made due to an increased 
familiarity for more recently viewed items as these were not list discrimination 
studies. It is possible and in general, always a concern, that participants may not have 
a firm grasp of what a K response is meant to engender, as such participants may be 
recollecting partial detail and incorrectly labeling their experience as K. It is also 
possible however that K judgments can reflect a type of familiarity that is source 
specifying, (e.g., a memory that includes some kind of contextual information without 
the addition of recollected content) an explanation at odds with a dual process 
conceptualization of familiarity. 
The only firm conclusion that can be drawn from studies utilising the RK task 
is that all possible expectations for the task appear possible. The critical implication is 
that content recollection may or may not occur, however the degree to which it is 
necessary for source memory or a list discrimination task is uncertain given the 
variable nature of the data. There may be issues with the task, however it may also be 
that content is sometimes important and sometimes not. The following section 
explores the idea of content recollection that is not diagnostic or useful in a list or 
source discrimination task. 
Criterial and Noncriterial Recollection: Implications for Episodic 
Recognition. 
The idea that the content that comes to mind is the information used to specify 
source is intuitive. However there is also some intuitive understanding that perhaps 
there are situations where content is more likely to be helpful than others. As an 
example, consider the design of an experiment Reder et al., (2000) conducted in order 
to ascertain if R judgments were more likely to reflect contextual information about 
the encoding event. Using a list discrimination task they made sure that the font type 
and background colour were different for every list. Reder et al., (2000) found that 
correct list discrimination occurred more often after R judgments were made than K 
judgments. The distinctive features that accompanied list membership (font type and 
background colour) increase the available content in memory indicative of list 
membership. In such a design it appears entirely likely that participants would be 
more likely to make list discrimination judgments due to content recollection.  
As well as indicating that the most stringent of instructions should be used 
when utilising the RK paradigm, Yonelinas et al., (2010) notes that procedures should 
be used that increase the likelihood that content recollected will be discriminating. 
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Naturally the more available recollected content is to the memory system then the 
more likely it will be helpful on a list discrimination task. Many studies have found 
that R judgments are easily manipulated by varying the level of processing at study 
(i.e., Gardiner 1988; Rajaram 1993; Gardiner and Parkin, 1990). However, apart from 
those who have been interested in false recollection (i.e., Roediger and McDermott, 
1995) little consideration has been given to the idea that in some tasks in which the 
RK paradigm is applied, participants may have very little to base a R response on, and 
in such a case, what might a R response represent? This may be the reason why 
sometimes R judgments are made to false alarms. To comment that content is helpful 
only under certain conditions does not explain how necessary content is in an episodic 
task, it only explains how useful it is in an episodic task that can easily enable the 
recollection of source specifying content. 
Others have often considered the real life examples that support a role for 
recollected content. For example, the idea of mentally reliving a previous moment, 
filled with detail that can involve many content rich experiences, such as greeting 
your father at the airport after a long separation, your first overseas trip or going on a 
skiing holiday with a group of friends. However, if you always have the same 
breakfast, at the same time in the morning and in the same spot then there is very little 
content available to distinguish yesterday’s breakfast from eating breakfast last week. 
Yet despite this, common experience also allows that we can still have some ability to 
distinguish such episodes. This possibly has implications when we consider that an 
episodic memory task is though to be accomplished via the retrieval of source 
specifying content. That is, content may frequently be available to the memory system 
however the content recalled may not always be helpful in discriminating between 
different episodes.  
In consideration of issues raised regarding the RK procedure, Yonelinas and 
Jacoby (1996) went on to explore a possible role for the kind of recollection that does 
not discriminate between sources in a source-monitoring task. Yonelinas and Jacoby 
(1996) had participants study words that were either presented on the left or right side 
of the screen, in small or large font. Participants were explicitly instructed to 
remember the words and their position on the screen (and were encouraged to 
associate one side of the screen with a particular person or place), but were not told to 
focus on the change in font size. There were four test conditions, one tested source 
monitoring for the word position (left or right) which was considered to be the easy 
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discrimination condition, while the other tested source monitoring for font size 
(difficult discrimination condition). Participants responded under speeded or non-
speeded response conditions. Participants responded, “yes” if the word was on the 
appropriate side/font, or if they could not remember how the word was presented at 
study but thought the word had been studied, or “no” if the word was new or if it was 
presented on the inappropriate side/font size. Inclusion responses were counted as the 
participant responding “yes” if they accept the word from the left side under left side 
instructions and if they accept the word from the right side under right side 
instructions. The same was true for the difficult discrimination (font size) condition. 
Exclusion responses were counted as participants responding “yes” to accepting a 
word from the left side under right side instructions and vice versa and the same for 
the font size condition. According to process dissociation logic, recollection (R) was 
estimated as the difference between inclusion (I) and exclusion (E) scores (P(R) = P(I) 
– P(E)). Familiarity (F) was estimated as the probability of accepting an item under 
exclusion conditions, divided by 1 minus the probability of recollection (P(F) = 
P(E)/(1-P(I)+P(E)). 
Yonelinas and Jacoby (1996) found that estimates of recollection were greater 
when participants had more time to respond and in the easy discrimination condition, 
thus supporting the dual process assumption that recollection is effortful. In addition 
estimated familiarity did not vary between the response speed conditions which is 
congruent with the assumption made that familiarity is automatic (therefore always 
fast and unaffected by a speeded response). However, estimated familiarity did 
increase in the hard discrimination condition compared to the easy condition.  This is 
contrary to the assumption that familiarity is acquired in an automatic fashion.  
Yonelinas and Jacoby (1996) attributed the change in estimated familiarity to a type 
of recollection that did not discriminate between sources. They postulated that this 
type of recollection would have been more likely to occur in the difficult 
discrimination condition. That is, during the difficult source task, recollecting which 
side the word had occurred on would be irrelevant to the size decision but would still 
have been useful in deciding whether the word had occurred in the experiment.  They 
termed this form of recollection ‘noncriterial’. Yonelinas and Jacoby (1996) argued 
that if noncriterial recollection were acting like ‘criterial’ (source specifying) 
recollection than it should have been strategic and therefore differed under speeded 
and non-speeded conditions. In the difficult discrimination condition estimates of 
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familiarity were not changed by speeded responding, therefore the authors proposed 
that sometimes content recollection can occur that does not inform of source and it 
can occur quickly or automatically and thus act more like familiarity, rather than 
being the result of an effortful process (however see Parks, 2007).   
There are a number of implications of noncriterial recollection that Yonelinas 
and Jacoby (1996) fail to explore. Yonelinas and Jacoby (1996) acknowledge that 
noncriterial recollection is problematic for the RK paradigm, considering that R 
responses do not distinguish between criterial and noncriterial information. This could 
account for the results I mentioned earlier that indicate that R responses are 
sometimes reported based on very partial information and can support inaccurate 
memory judgments. However, this must also be considered a problem for the 
inclusion condition of the PDP. Successful responses to inclusion questions might be 
accompanied by both criterial and noncriterial information, however this is not 
considered by Yonelinas and Jacoby (1996). The authors further do not consider the 
role that retrieval intention plays in their results. That is, they state that recollected 
content that participants intend to retrieve is effortful, whereas recollected content that 
they don’t intend to retrieve is not effortful, without specifically addressing this 
change in retrieval intention. It may simply be that a certain amount of memorable 
information comes to mind quickly, though this may not necessarily be criterial in 
nature. In the case that participants need to look for discriminatory information then 
this process may involve something more. This could require the use of contextual 
cues or some kind of directed search. Regardless of how this process may occur, this 
issue has implications for estimates of recollection and familiarity gained from the 
PDP. 
Is Recollected Content, as Reflected by R Judgments, Useful in List 
Discrimination or Simply More Available to the Memory System Under Certain 
Conditions?  
As noted, Yonelinas and Jacoby (1996) found that estimated familiarity was 
higher in the difficult discrimination condition and they assumed that this was due to 
the use of noncriterial information. However when they found that the use of this 
information did not vary with the speed of responding they assumed that it was acting 
like familiarity, which violated the assumption of content recollection. As an 
alternative, Humphreys et al., (2003) proposed that information that participants were 
not intending to recall was experienced as familiarity and not as recollection. 
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Therefore, the alternative was that assumed equality of familiarity for both the 
inclusion and exclusion conditions could be violated as participants may rely on 
familiarity more in the inclusion condition than the exclusion condition. This 
possibility would undermine estimates of recollection and familiarity gained from the 
PDP. 
In their second experiment Humphreys et al., (2003) asked participants to first 
make recognition judgments to heard or read words along with RK judgments and 
then gave participants a source monitoring task presented in the exclusion format. 
Half the participants were asked to respond “yes” if the words were heard and to 
respond “no” if new or not heard, the others were asked to respond the same way for 
read words. These instructions were referred to as congruent if the process of studying 
the items was congruent with the test question (i.e., studied read words (studied 
visual), asked to say “yes” if the word was read (tested on visual)). They compared 
the probability of saying “yes” to incongruent or congruent questions on test 2 
conditional on RK judgments from test 1. They found that for both congruent and 
incongruent questions, the probability of a “yes” response conditional on a R response 
was greater than the probability of a “yes” response conditional on a K response. 
According to dual process assumptions the occurrence of recollection on test 1 should 
have made it more likely that recollection would occur on test 2.  However, 
recollection on test 2 should have supported a “yes” response only in the congruent 
condition. In the incongruent condition recollection should have supported a “no” 
response. Furthermore, source accuracy was greater for congruent questions given a K 
response than incongruent questions given a K response. Thus K responses could 
support correct source decisions and R responses could support incorrect source 
decisions. While it may be that sometimes content may be useful in order to perform 
the exclusion condition, the Humphreys et al., (2003) results support the idea that 
content recollection is not always necessary for a source decision. 
Humphreys et al., (2003) suggested that by asking two different types of 
questions they were changing the retrieval intention of participants between 
conditions. That is, participants were looking for different types of evidence 
depending on the question asked (heard or visual).  For example, if the question asked 
is about the visual content of a test item when that item had been heard at study then 
visual content would not come to mind, as there is none. In addition, if auditory 
content comes to mind the participant will respond, “no” not “yes”. Thus it seems 
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feasible that information that participants were not intending to recall was 
experienced as familiarity. That is, they may have been responding, “yes” to stronger 
memories that may feel like a strong sense of familiarity. This poses a problem for 
estimates of recollection and familiarity in the PDP, as it may be that different 
information supports the answers to inclusion and exclusion questions simply because 
those conditions ask for different information, not necessarily because one type of 
information is necessary for one condition and not another.  
Results from Bodner and Lindsay (2003) indicate that certain contextual 
features of the test list may influence the likelihood that participants will willingly 
report noncriterial recollection. Employing a level of processing (LOP) task Bodner 
and Lindsay (2003) found that reported content recollection, as indicated by R 
judgments, could be affected by the test list context. In their first experiment they had 
participants study two lists with strength of LOP manipulated between groups. Both 
groups studied the same list of medium items, however one group also studied a list 
of shallow items (medium-shallow) and the other group studied a list of deep items 
(medium-deep). Participants were then tested on those items along with new items. 
They found that although recognition was not greatly affected by the strength 
manipulation, that R judgments were much more likely to be made to medium items 
in the medium-shallow than the medium-deep test context condition. Their second 
experiment confirmed that this was an effect of test context rather than study context. 
In their third experiment they ran a source-monitoring task instead of a RK task and 
found that source accuracy did not differ for the medium group between test context 
conditions. Therefore, both recognition performance and source identification for the 
medium items did not differ even if R responses did. One possibility, offered by 
Bodner and Lindsay, is that content was useful for identifying medium items, 
however different recollective experiences dictated by the test list context led to 
different definitions of R and K for those items. A related interpretation to consider is 
that at times content was not judged to be useful (at least for medium items) and was 
simply more likely to be reported in one condition for medium items than the other.	   
The fact that performance on medium items did not change while R responses 
did, suggests that the two dependent variables were not strongly related. This 
conclusion is further supported by the fact that the same information was reported in 
one condition and not the other. One would expect that if recollected content were 
helpful in making a memory decision then it would be just as likely to be reported in 
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both conditions considering that recognition performance did not differ. Therefore it 
seems entirely possible that the information reported to medium items in the medium-
shallow test condition was largely noncriterial, that is, it was not helpful in 
completing the task. Furthermore, the fact that participants only reported it in one 
condition indicates that participants may have been aware that the information 
retrieved was not useful. At the very least the Bodner and Lindsay (2003) results have 
implications for the RK paradigm, specifically that contextual elements can change 
the way that information is reported. It is also possible that when this information is 
objectively unhelpful or is not perceived to be helpful, participants may still label 
their subjective experience as R. The incentive to report noncriterial recollection is 
most likely due to demand characteristics of the RK task.  
Typical RK instructions start by first introducing to participants the idea that 
recognition memory can be accomplished via two processes, recollection or 
familiarity. This is instead of giving participants the option of responding R or K 
when they feel like either process is helping them to make their recognition decision.  
It is of little doubt then that participants might then expect to use either recollection 
and familiarity and therefore may report R simply because the instructions have 
informed them that recollection should occur. In Bodner and Lindsay (2003) this may 
have resulted in R responses to noncriterial information. Instructions do not usually 
indicate that not all recollected information might be helpful, however the instructions 
for participants to focus on criterial information used in Yonelinas (2002) might help 
to prevent the reporting of R to noncriterial information. 
While it is clear that participants can sometimes retrieve content, it remains 
unclear as to how useful this content can be. The PDP assumptions regarding the role 
of content recollection may not hold under certain conditions (Humphreys et al., 
2003) and there is some evidence to suggest that content recollection is not always 
useful, though still may be reported (Bodner and Lindsay, 2003). In partial support of 
Humphreys et al., (2003), Jacoby, Shimuzu, Daniels and Rhodes (2005) found that 
directing participants to a particular source at test produced a qualitative change in the 
type of information used for memory judgments. This led Jacoby et al. (2005) to 
propose that under some conditions, source information (context) is used to constrain 
what comes to mind during retrieval, and that this in turn would affect what 
information is used to make a recognition decision. It may be that this occurred in 
Jacoby et al. (2005); however in Bodner and Lindsay (2003) reported information 
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changed for the same items when memory performance didn’t, and in Humphreys et 
al., (2003) if participants were relying on recollection at all, then it supported both 
correct and incorrect source judgments depending on the question asked. I cannot rule 
out the possibility that content recollection is sometimes useful during source 
monitoring or episodic recognition tasks.  However, I cannot decipher whether it is 
content that is directing the memory decision (as assumed by Jacoby and colleagues) 
or if recollected content occurs after the memory decision or not at all, as assumed by 
Humphreys et al., (2003).  
Research Questions and Proposed Methodology 
I do not deny that typical recognition testing with old/new instructions will 
sometimes be accompanied by the subjective experience of remembering thoughts 
and memories of other words and that these recollections will be generally 
attributable to what happened at study as indexed by a R judgment. However I would 
like to know which of the following interpretations is correct:  
1) Recognition decisions in a list specific task are not based on content 
recollection.  
2) Content recollection can occur but is not pivotal for list discrimination.  
3) Content recollection, as revealed in subjective reports, plays a crucial role 
in list discrimination or source monitoring.  
Put simply, I wish to ascertain how necessary content recollection is in a list 
specific recognition task. Ascertaining the usefulness of content recollection in 
recognition tasks has been hindered by a general preference for single study and test 
list recognition paradigms. In such single list designs, successful recognition can be 
achieved through a number of different paths. It can occur via acontextual familiarity, 
contextual familiarity, recalling a list item using other list items or a category label as 
a cue or through content recollection. However, by using a task that will limit the use 
of content recollection I can test the possibility that content recollection is not the 
only way to perform episodic recognition. My proposal is to have participants study 
and be tested on multiple lists constructed of the same items. In this list-specific 
design, the same list of words will be tested on each list, however the targets and 
distracters will be randomized on every list. In this situation the thoughts and 
reactions one has while studying a word will become less unique in each successive 
list. Thus content should become more and more irrelevant over the repeated 
presentations in different lists. Because the same words will be presented on every list 
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all of the words will also become increasingly familiar. Therefore participants will not 
be able to easily rely on acontextual familiarity or content recollection in order to 
perform the task. Thus the task will be episodic, however participants should not find 
content recollection useful. 
Despite the increased difficulty of the task, it should be possible for 
participants to discriminate old from new items even by the last list. I state this mostly 
because similar methodology has been applied elsewhere for a similar purpose, (i.e., 
Weeks, Humphreys and Hockley 2007, Heathcote, Raymond and Dunn, 2006). While 
performance was negatively affected in these studies, participants were still able to 
perform the task. It is possible for participants to complete this kind of task if 
participants have the opportunity to reinstate the study context (i.e., Humphreys, Bain 
and Pike, 1989). This might be helped by the addition of instructions indicating to 
participants to recognize items form the previous list only. Participants may also 
spontaneously reinstate aspects of the study context (Smith and Vela, 2001). In the 
event that both a dual process interpretation is ruled out and participants are able to 
still perform the task, then further consideration will be given to how successful 
recognition might be achieved in the final discussion. 
Further to examining the role of content recollection, I can also examine a 
question related to my content recollection question. I would further like to 
understand what the relationship is between accuracy of R judgments and accuracy of 
recognition by including a RK task. After making an old recognition judgment, 
participants will be asked to describe their recognition as R or K. I am not sure what 
will happen to R responses as recollection becomes increasingly noncriterial in 
nature. As the Bodner and Lindsay (2003) results indicate, participants might realize 
that their subjective experience is noncriterial and stop making R responses. 
Alternatively they may continue to make R responses. The methodology I employ 
should make criterial recollection quite difficult to achieve, the inclusion of the RK 
paradigm will either support this or may reflect noncriterial recollection. If R 
judgments support hits rather than false alarms however then I may need to consider 
the possibility that content is still useful.  
Overview of Chapters 
Chapter 2 includes three experiments. All three experiments aim to understand 
how useful content can be in an episodic recognition task using the basic design 
described previously. In addition these experiments tested how making RK decisions 
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may affect the recognition task. This sometimes involved asking these decisions at a 
delay or asking these decisions on every list or only on the final list. Attempts were 
made to reduce the likelihood that participants would be affected by the knowledge of 
recollection and familiarity, so that it could be understood as to how the act of making 
judgments might affect the task rather than how participants might approach the task 
with prior knowledge of RK. Results from these studies indicated that participants 
could perform the task, however it was difficult to interpret whether or not content 
was useful to participants.  
Chapter 3 includes three experiments that replicate and extend on the 
experiments included in chapter 2. In particular, a new method of assessing a 
relationship between RK judgments and hits was introduced in this chapter which 
indicated that content was not helpful for the majority of participants. The addition of 
a condition where participants were asked to justify their R responses further 
supported this conclusion.  
The final experiment included in chapter 4 clarifies a number of prior effects. 
In particular it was possible to examine speculation that the introduction of the RK 
procedure may encourage a reliance on recollection without familiarity. The inclusion 
of a longer study-test retention intervals (as had been applied in experiments 1 to 4) 
across all conditions and lists allowed me to examine how increasing retention 
interval potentiated a decrease in recognition performance on the final list with the 
inclusion of the RK task.  
CHAPTER 2 
Experiment 1 
It is possible that the act of asking participants to make R or K responses will 
change the way in which participants perform the task (Humphreys et al., 2003, 
Dennis and Humphreys, 2001). In particular Humphreys et al., (2003) point out that 
whenever two judgments occur together, we might expect the first judgment to 
possibly be affected by the knowledge that another judgment will follow. 
Furthermore, typical RK instructions begin by informing participants that their 
recognition of words will involve recollection and familiarity. This strongly suggests 
to participants that they should use the two processes, thus participants may actively 
try to recollect details when they otherwise would not in order to satisfy the RK task 
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demands. If my interpretation of Bodner and Lindsay (2003) is correct then it is also 
possible that these instructions induce participants to make an R response even if they 
are aware that their recollection is noncriterial.  
In experiment 1, participants received four study and test lists. RK judgments 
were made only on the final list under two between subject conditions. In the delayed 
condition, participants made RK judgments after making all of their recognition 
judgments for that list. In the immediate condition RK judgments were made as they 
usually are, that is after each recognition decision. I introduced the RK decisions after 
the study session on the final trial to rule out the possibility that participants would 
change the way they study the items due to their anticipation of having to make a RK 
decision. The delayed condition was an attempt to try and rule out the possibility that 
participants may change the way they perform the recognition task while making RK 
judgments. 
Method 
Participants 
40 students from The University of Queensland participated in the study. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions, delayed or immediate. 
The data from 5 participants was lost due to computer error, which left 18 participants 
in the delayed condition and 17 participants in the immediate condition. The variables 
to be measured were both RK decisions and recognition accuracy. 
Procedure and Materials 
The experiment was computer administered. The Nelson, McEvoy, and 
Schreiber (1998) norms were used to find 40 medium frequency unrelated words for 
the study. Every participant received four study and test lists. The same pool of 40 
words was randomised to produce different targets and distracters on every list 
without any restrictions regarding how often a word was studied. Participants studied 
a list of 20 words; each word appeared one at a time and remained on the screen for 
two seconds before the next word appeared. At test one word was presented to the 
center of the screen and participants were asked to indicate if that word was “OLD” or 
“NEW” by clicking on the appropriate on screen button.  
Participants were warned when they were about to enter a study or test phase. 
From the second list onwards, participants received test instructions before each test 
phase that explicitly stated that they were only to respond old to items that they had 
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studied on the previous study list, and not to words that may have appeared on prior 
lists.  
On the final list participants made RK decisions either immediately or at a 
delay. In the immediate condition after making an old recognition decision 
participants were presented with two more buttons; “Remember” or  “Know”. 
Participants were asked to describe their recognition experience as R or K by clicking 
on the appropriate button. RK instructions were modeled off Rajaram (1996) and 
were presented to participants before the test phase of the final list.  
In the delayed condition participants completed the recognition task on the 
final list as they had on previous lists. After this, participants were presented with the 
items they had just been tested on. All items remained in the same list position from 
the recognition test in order to make the RK task easier to complete. Participants 
received RK instructions before the RK test but after the recognition test on the final 
list. During the RK task, participants were presented with one word at a time along 
with three response buttons ‘Remember’, ‘Know’ and ‘New’. They were clearly 
instructed that they were to describe their prior old recognition judgments as R or K 
and click on the ‘new’ button if they had previously indicated that the item was new 
in the recognition task.    
Results 
Recognition  
Table 1. Experiment 1. Hits and false alarms broken down by list number and RK 
responseiInterval 
 
 RK Response Interval 
 Delayed Immediate 
List 1 Hit .847 .809 
 False Alarm .064 .047 
List 2 Hit .817 .827 
 False Alarm .272 .327 
List 3 Hit .800 .829 
 False Alarm .244 .315 
List 4 Hit .792 .832 
  False Alarm .261 .606 
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The results of a 2 between RK response interval (delayed vs immediate) by 4 
within (list: 1, 2, 3, 4) ANOVA on hit rates (see Table 1) failed to produce a 
significant main effect of RK response interval, F (1, 33) = .082, p = .776, MSE = 
.046, ηp2 = .002; or list, F (3,99) = .114, p = .951, MSE = .016, ηp2 = .003 and no 
significant interaction between list and RK response interval was observed, F (3,99) = 
.674, p = .570, MSE = .016, p = .570, ηp2 = .020.  
The same analysis conducted on false alarms revealed a main effect of RK 
response interval, F (1, 33)=5.558, p = .024, MSE = .080, ηp2 = .144 such that the 
immediate group were more likely to incorrectly respond ‘old’ (M = .32) than the 
delayed group (M = .21); a main effect of list was also noted, F (3,99) = 35.615, p < 
.001, MSE = .024, ηp2 = .519. Follow up comparisons revealed that, all lists 
significantly differed (p < .05) except list 2 and 3 (p = .516). In addition, the analysis 
revealed a significant interaction between list and RK response interval, F (3,99) = 
9.168, p <.001, MSE = .024, ηp2 = .217. The interaction between list and RK response 
interval can be viewed in Figure 1. When followed up by examining simple effects it 
was found that more false alarms were produced on list 4 than all prior lists in the 
immediate condition (p < .05), however this was not observed in the delayed 
condition.  
	  
Figure 1. Experiment 1. False Alarms as a function of list and RK response interval 
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Table 2. Experiment 1. RK judgments as a function of recognition accuracy and RK 
response interval 
 Delayed Immediate 
  R K R K 
Hit .567 .297 .477 .371 
FA .439 .294 .344 .279 
 
My interest was primarily on how R judgments were affected by the task and 
therefore only R judgments are analysed (see Table 2 for a full summary of RK data). 
A 2 between RK response interval (delayed vs immediate) by 2 within accuracy (hit 
vs false alarm) mixed ANOVA was conducted on R responses. The results of this 
analysis revealed that R judgments were significantly more likely to be made to hits 
(M = 0.52) than false alarms (M = .39), F (1, 33) = 11.280, p = .002, MSE = .026, ηp2 
= .255. The effect of accuracy did not vary by RK response interval (F (1, 33) = 
0.003, p = .953, ns), nor did the delayed and immediate groups significantly differ (F 
(1, 33) = 1.548, p = .222, ns). 
Discussion 	   The most interesting result from experiment 1 was that the introduction of the 
RK paradigm in the immediate condition significantly increased the likelihood that 
participants would respond old to test items on the final list. Despite this participants 
could otherwise perform the recognition task quite well. Participants in the immediate 
condition were also adept at making R responses more to hits rather than false alarms. 
Although participants were more likely to make R responses to hits than false alarms 
in the delayed condition, participants in the delayed condition were clearly not 
performing the RK task very well. Summing across R and K judgments made to hits 
in table 2, the number of hits on the delayed test exceeds the mean number of hits 
made on the recognition test (see Table 1) by .072. While this is not all that troubling, 
the mean number of false alarms on the delayed test exceeds the mean number of 
false alarms on the recognition test by .472. Taken together, it is clear that participants 
were likely to overestimate how many old decisions they had made on the recognition 
test. It may be that participants are not remembering their recognition judgment and 
are on the second test making that judgment again. If this is the case then by the time 
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participants perform the delayed test then the extra familiarity from the recognition 
test makes most items appear old.  
 
Experiment 2 	  
Experiment 2 was devised to replicate the immediate condition of experiment 
1 and also to explore how RK judgments might change from list to list. It was queried 
as to whether or not the poor performance on the final list would still be present if 
participants were well practiced at the task. In this case, it was considered that 
participants may become more adept at evaluating their R judgment (e.g., they may 
have become aware that the content recollected was noncriterial). It was also possible 
that a gradual decline in recognition performance may occur in line with the results 
from the final condition.  Like experiment 1, experiment 2 will again have 2 between 
subject conditions. The final condition will replicate the immediate condition in 
experiment 1. In the continuous condition, participants will make RK decisions on all 
four trials. Judgments in both conditions will always be made immediately. 
Method 
Participants 
40 participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions, final or 
continuous. The variables to be measured will be both the nature of the RK decisions 
and recognition accuracy. Due to computer error the data from two participants was 
lost leaving 19 participants in each group. 
Procedure and Materials 
The procedure and materials were largely identical to that in experiment 1 
with two exceptions. The first was that all RK judgments were made immediately. 
The second was that a continuous condition was added, such that participants made 
RK judgments on every list. Participants in the continuous condition received RK 
instructions before the test phase of the first list, while participants in the final 
condition received RK instructions before the test phase of the final list.  
Results 
Recognition 
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Table 3. Experiment 2. Hits and false alarms as a function of list and RK frequency 
 
 RK frequency 
 Final Continuous 
List 1 Hit .868 .837 
 False Alarm .053 .068 
List 2 Hit .811 .768 
 False Alarm .247 .255 
List 3 Hit .813 .763 
 False Alarm .284 .224 
List 4 Hit .832 .737 
  False Alarm .447 .168 
 
A 2 between RK frequency (continuous vs final) by 4 within (list) mixed 
ANOVA conducted on hit rates (see Table 3) failed to find a significant main effect of 
list, F (3, 108) = 2.323, p = .079, MSE = .018, ηp2 = .061; nor of RK frequency, 
F(1,36) = 2.027, p = .163, MSE = .056, ηp2 = .053. RK frequency also did not vary 
depending on list, F (3,108) = .418, p = .740, MSE = 0.018, ηp2 = .011.  
The same analysis on false alarms (see Table 3) produced a significant main 
effect of list, F (3, 108) = 23.268, p < .001, MSE = .019, ηp2 = .393. Follow up 
comparisons revealed that list 1 produced fewer false alarms to all other lists (p < 
.001) however no other lists significantly differed (list 2 and list 3: p = .920, list 2 and 
list 4: p = .109, list 3 and list 4: p = .106). There was no significant main effect of RK 
frequency, F (1, 36) = 2.079, p= .158, MSE = .114, ηp2 = .055. There was, however, a 
significant interaction between list and RK frequency, F (3, 108) = 9.375, p < .001, 
MSE = .019, ηp2 = .207. The significant interaction can be viewed in Figure 2. Follow 
up simple effects revealed that significantly more false alarms were made on list 4 
than all other lists in the final condition, (p < .05). However this was not observed in 
the continuous condition.  
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Figure 2. Experiment 2. Proportion of false alarms across list and RK frequency 
condition 
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A full breakdown of RK results can be viewed in Table 4. A 2 between RK 
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ANOVA was conducted on R responses. As in experiment 1 I again found that R 
judgments were more likely to accompany hits (M = .53) than false alarms (M = .17), 
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ns. Nor did the final or continuous groups differ significantly, F (1, 36) = 3.177, p = 
.083, ns.  
Discussion 
As in experiment 1, the results of experiment 2 clearly showed that 
participants could perform the task adequately. Also, again the introduction of RK 
judgments on the final trial greatly decreased the ability of participants to distinguish 
between items that were studied on the previous list and items studied on all previous 
lists. However, when participants were practiced at the RK task then recognition 
performance was not adversely affected. Also like experiment 1, R responses were 
more likely to be made to hits than false alarms. 
Although the results from experiments 1 and 2 indicated that the surprise 
inclusion of the RK paradigm on a demanding task may negatively effect 
performance, this may have been due to the fact that retention interval varied between 
conditions. It was necessary to present the RK instructions before the test phase as I 
did not wish participants to change the way they approached the task. All instructions 
were self-paced and the RK instructions presented for participants in the final 
condition would take on average about 40 seconds longer to read through than the 
same recognition test instructions presented on the continuous condition. The same 
retention interval difference was also present on the first list of the continuous 
condition. This did not produce a significant difference between groups, however the 
task was much less demanding on list 1.  
A longer retention interval may also have produced the observed differences 
between the immediate and delayed conditions in experiment 1. In the immediate 
condition participants received RK instructions before the recognition test (since both 
judgments were made at the same time), however RK instructions were presented to 
participants in the delayed condition after the recognition test and therefore again, the 
retention interval was larger in the immediate than the delayed condition. Furthermore 
the presentation of the instructions in the delayed condition (after the recognition test 
and before making RK decisions) would have made the RK task a lot more difficult. 
A simple experiment was run in order to directly test if the poorer performance on the 
final list with the addition of the RK task was still observable when retention interval 
was controlled.  
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Experiment 3 	  
In experiment 3 I essentially replicated experiment 1 excluding the delayed 
judgment condition. Thus one group simply performed the recognition task without 
RK judgments. The focus from experiment 1 and 2 was placed ultimately on the 
abrupt change on the final list with the introduction of the RK task and thus the third 
experiment was focused on clarifying that effect. The experiment was run with a 
control for the retention interval for the recognition only condition. 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 40 participants recruited from the same source as the previous two 
experiments participated in the study. Twenty participants were randomly assigned to 
one of two between subject test conditions, final or recognition only. The variables to 
be measured were both RK decisions and recognition accuracy. 
Procedure and Materials 
The procedure and materials were largely identical to that in experiment 1 
with the exception that participants in the recognition only condition did not receive a 
RK task. Also while participants in the final condition received RK instructions after 
studying list 4, participants in the recognition only condition received a paragraph 
about confirmation bias, which was tested by friends of the experimenter to take 
approximately 50 seconds to read through (the same amount of time to read through 
the RK instructions). This particular paragraph was chosen because it was interesting 
and novel to participants and therefore likely to engage attention to a similar level to 
those participants in the final condition reading the RK instructions.  
Results 
Recognition 
Table 5. Experiment 3. Proportion of hits, false alarms and d-prime values broken 
down by list and RK group 
 
 RK 
 Recognition Only Final 
List 1 Hit .890 .900 
 False Alarm .118 .108 
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 Dprime 2.432 2.537 
List 2 Hit .823 .840 
 False Alarm .215 .313 
 Dprime 1.687 1.460 
List 3 Hit .760 .698 
 False Alarm .248 .345 
 Dprime 1.329 .968 
List 4 Hit .743 .668 
  False Alarm .333 .398 
 Dprime 1.042 .697 
 
Instead of simply examining hits and false alarms, I also considered 
comparing d-prime values in order to examine overall accuracy. D-prime values were 
calculated with the standard correction (see Table 5) and a 2 between (group: 
recognition only vs final) by 4 within (list) mixed ANOVA was conducted on those 
values. There was a main effect of list F (3,144) = 47.797, p < .001, MSE = .417, ηp2 
= .557. Follow up main comparisons revealed that accuracy declined significantly 
with each list (p < .05). Recognition accuracy did not differ significantly between the 
groups (F (1, 38) = 1.120, p= .297, ns). The interaction was also not significant, F (3, 
144) = 1.126, p = .342, ns). 
In order to explore this further I examined hits and false alarms separately (see 
Table 5). The same analysis conducted on the false alarms and hits reflected the same 
pattern of results of the d-prime analysis and are therefore not mentioned.  
Remember-Know 
Table 6. Experiment 3. RK judgments as a function of accuracy in the final condition 
 Final 
  R K 
Hit .390 .278 
FA .198 .200 
 
A one way repeated measures ANOVA on list 4 data for standard RK 
judgments produced a significant difference between R responses made to hits and to 
false alarms, such that R judgments were significantly more likely to be made to hits 
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than false alarms (F (1, 19) = 13.522, p = .002, MSE = .027, ηp2 = .416). See Table 6 
to view the mean proportion of RK judgments made to hits and false alarms.  
Discussion 
The results of experiment 3 did not replicate the dramatic change in the false 
alarm rate on the final list in the RK condition compared to the recognition condition. 
However a perusal of the hits and false alarms does indicate a trend in the same 
direction. It should be noted that the increase in retention interval for both conditions 
in experiment 3 did not affect performance all that badly, or at least, the effect was 
not as dramatic as what had been observed in experiments1 and 2. There is some 
ambiguity surrounding the results of the experiments in chapter 1 as a result of this. 
While it appears that the difference observed in recognition performance between the 
two groups might be due to the increased retention interval, I can not conclude this 
absolutely.  It is possible that the effect of introducing the RK task on the final list 
was present but small and that the longer retention interval potentiated the effect 
noted in the first two experiments. In addition experiment 3 did not include a 
continuous group with a control for retention interval, adding a continuous condition 
might help to clarify the effect of the retention interval compared to the effect of 
making RK judgments for the first time on the final list.   
Another consideration is that the results of the RK paradigm indicate that 
participants are quite accurate with R judgments and we did not note any group 
differences in the first two experiments. This seems odd considering that recognition 
performance was so poor in the final condition in these experiments, yet there were no 
concurrent group differences in R accuracy, if recollection were helpful then surely 
the false alarm rate should not have been so high. The traditional way of measuring R 
responses, may tell us something about accuracy but cannot tell us what this response 
represents and whether or not content recollection was responsible for the recognition 
decision. In order to establish how useful content is, I reconsider the typical way of 
measuring RK judgments and instead offer an alternative in the next chapter.  
CHAPTER 3 	  
In order to establish how useful content is, I will have to reconsider the typical 
way of measuring RK judgments. RK judgments are usually scored by taking the 
proportion of R responses made to hits and then dividing that number by the total 
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number of old items. In addition R responses made to false alarms are then divided by 
the total number of new items. This provides a good measure of how accurate R 
responses are, however it does not inform us about whether or not recollection was 
responsible for the recognition decision. The alternative is that the participant first 
makes a recognition decision and then assigns a R response to some proportion of the 
items that were identified as old. Whenever participants are more likely to correctly 
identify an old item as old than to incorrectly identify a new item as old then the 
procedure of first recognizing and then assigning a R response will result in a larger 
number of R responses to old words than to new words. That is, the traditional way of 
presenting RK results will indicate that R responses are accurate but will not tell us 
that recollection was responsible for the accuracy. Given this issue, my proposal is to 
calculate a chi square statistic for each participant that will test for a relationship 
between RK judgments and recognition decisions. If we reject the null hypothesis and 
if R responses are more likely for hits than for false alarms then such a result would 
be consistent with the idea that recollection is accurate and is driving the recognition 
decision. However, if we accept the null hypothesis then we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that R responses are made to recognized items independently of whether 
the recognized item constitutes a hit or a false alarm. Note that there is some existing 
support for the idea that the recognition decision is at least partially responsible for 
the R response as opposed to the idea that content recollection is responsible for the 
recognition decision. That is, Higham and Vokey (2004) found that R responses, 
especially to new words, were more likely in the case that there was no prior 
recognition decision.   
 In addition to the above we can examine the relationship between recognition 
accuracy and the relationship between R judgments and recognition judgments (as 
measured by the chi square statistic). If participants who achieve a high chi square 
value and therefore are more likely to respond R to hits than false alarms, also 
perform well on the recognition task (as indicated by d-prime values) then this would 
be consistent with the theory that those participants are using content in order to 
perform the recognition task. However, I may also find a lack of correlation between 
the two. A dual process explanation would not be supported for example if I found 
that the majority of participants who performed well on the recognition task failed to 
produce significant chi square values. Examining the correlation between these two 
measures should help to clarify this relationship. It should be noted however, that 
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these techniques can not prove definitively that participants are or are not using 
content effectively, rather the results of these measures will either be congruent or 
incongruent with the content hypothesis.  
Experiment 4 
Method 
Participants 
40 students from the University of Queensland were randomly assigned evenly to 
one of two between subject test conditions, final or continuous. The variables to be 
measured were both RK decisions and recognition accuracy. 
Procedure and Materials 
The procedure and materials were similar to experiment 2 except that in 
experiment 4 a control was introduced for the retention interval difference. For 
participants in the continuous condition, RK instructions were presented before they 
viewed the first study list, while participants in the final condition received RK 
instructions before being tested on the final list of words. Five friends of the 
experimenter were asked to read through the instructions and on average, it took them 
50 seconds. Therefore to equate the retention interval across conditions, before 
receiving the test phase in list 4, participants in the continuous condition read through 
a paragraph explaining confirmation bias (which was measured to take approximately 
as long to read through as the RK instructions). Participants read through a paragraph 
simply to give them an intervening task that was similar to reading through 
instructions for participants in the final condition. This seemed preferable to a blank 
screen, where they may have been able to rehearse items.  
Results 
Recognition 
Table 7. Experiment 4. D-prime values, hits and false alarms as a function of list 
number and RK frequency condition 
 
 RK Frequency 
 Continuous Final 
List 1 Hit 0.84 0.90 
 False Alarm 0.09 0.09 
 dʹ′ 2.28 2.57 
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List 2 Hit 0.80 0.80 
 False Alarm 0.24 0.37 
 dʹ′ 1.53 1.14 
List 3 Hit 0.77 0.71 
 False Alarm 0.30 0.42 
 dʹ′ 1.21 0.68 
List 4 Hit 0.73 0.65 
  False Alarm 0.29 0.51 
 dʹ′ 1.25 0.30 	  
In order to examine recognition performance d-prime values were calculated 
with the standard correction (see Table 7) and a 2 between RK Frequency (continuous 
vs final) by 4 within list ANOVA was conducted on those values. I found a 
significant difference between the two groups such that making RK judgments on 
every list (continuous) resulted in more sensitive decisions than the final group who 
did not make RK judgments until list four, F (1, 38) = 7.218, p = .011, MSE = .959, 
ηp
2 = .160. Follow up simple effects of a significant interaction between list and RK 
Frequency (F (3, 114) = 8.19, p < .001, MSE = .316, ηp2 = .177) revealed that the 
groups differed on every list (p < .05) except the first (p = .186). Unsurprisingly we 
found a significant main effect of list such that earlier lists produced more accurate 
responses than later lists (p < .001) except lists 3 and 4 (p = .193), F (3, 114) = 
68.883, p < .001, MSE =.316, ηp2 = .644.  
The between group differences in d-prime scores indicate that participants that 
made RK judgments on every list seemed to be able to adapt to the recognition task 
more efficiently by the second list than those participants that only made RK 
judgments on the final list. In order to explore this further I examined hits and false 
alarms separately by employing the same analysis that was applied on d-prime values. 
Only results that add to the interpretation of the d-prime analysis are mentioned. I 
found that significantly more false alarms were made in the final condition compared 
to the continuous condition on list 2 and list 4 (p < .05), congruent with the interaction 
observed between RK frequency and list in the d-prime analysis. In addition, hits 
differed between groups on list 1, with significantly more hits made in the final 
condition than the continuous (p = .011). This difference was not observed in the d-
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prime analysis due to the similar false alarm rate on list 1 across groups, this is not 
surprising as false alarms were rare on list 1 and therefore unlikely to differ between 
groups. 
It would therefore appear that having practice at making RK judgments 
resulted in a decrease in incorrectly labeling a new word as old. The difference in hit 
rates on the first list may also further indicate that initially making RK judgments is a 
little more difficult than just making old/new judgments.  When taken together these 
findings suggest that basing old/new decisions on separate decisions about 
recollection and familiarity may not be the normal way that the participants approach 
single item recognition.  
Remember-Know	  
Table 8. Experiment 4. Mean proportion of RK judgments as a function of RK 
frequency, list number and accuracy. 
  Continuous Final 
    R K R K 
List 1 Hit 0.47 0.37 - - 
 FA 0.03 0.06 - - 
List 2 Hit 0.46 0.34 - - 
 FA 0.13 0.12 - - 
List 3 Hit 0.48 0.29 - - 
 FA 0.16 0.15 - - 
List 4 Hit 0.51 0.22 0.37 0.28 
  FA 0.17 0.12 0.26 0.25 
 
As discussed previously, I will provide analysis results of the standard way of 
measuring RK judgments (see Table 8) and then I will also conduct a chi square 
analysis of this data for the final list across conditions and for all lists of the 
continuous condition (refer to Figure 3). I conducted a 2 between RK frequency (final 
vs continuous) by 2 within accuracy (hits vs false alarms) on R responses calculated 
in the standard way, made on the final list. In regards to accuracy, results indicated 
that overall R responses were more likely to be made to old than new items, F (1, 38) 
= 39.691, p < .001, MSE = .026, ηp2 = .511. Collapsing across accuracy the groups did 
not significantly differ (F (1,38) = 0.197, p = .659, ns.), however there was a 
significant interaction between group and accuracy, F (1, 38) = 10.251, p = .003, 
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MSE = .026, ηp2 = .212, revealing that R responses were much more likely to be 
accurate (a greater difference between hits and false alarms) in list 4 of the continuous 
condition then they were in the final condition. 
Thus not only did the continuous group perform more accurately than the final 
group on the recognition task, but they were also more likely to be correct when they 
indicated that their decision was based on recollection. Taken together, these results 
indicate a possible learning component to the RK paradigm. While the overall 
analysis indicates that R responses were more likely to be made to hits than false 
alarms, this does not tell us how useful recollected content is. That is it does not tell 
us whether recollection is responsible for the recognition decision or whether the 
recognition decision is responsible for the R response. 
 
Figure 3. Experiment 4. Proportion of individual chi square values occurring in each 
value range broken down by list and RK frequency.  
 
This analysis involved creating a 2x2 table (with 1 degree of freedom) for 
each participant. Raw scores produced by each participant were placed in the 
contingency table, with hits and false alarms placed on the vertical axis of the table 
and R and K judgments placed on the horizontal axis. I calculated chi square values 
across all lists. Participants could only be included if they produced both hits and false 
alarms, since false alarms were rare on list 1, the number of participants able to be 
included in the analysis were smaller on this list. However the main focus was on 
0	  0.1	  
0.2	  0.3	  
0.4	  0.5	  
0.6	  0.7	  
0.8	  0.9	  
0_2	   2_4	   4_6	   6_8	   8_10	   10_12	  
cont	  L1	  cont	  L2	  cont	  L3	  cont	  L4	  Sinal	  L4	  
	   40	  
performance in list 4 and it was rare for a participant to not produce a false alarm on 
that list. 
A significant chi square value for 1 degree of freedom would have to be larger 
than 3.84. In the 2 – 4 value range (see Figure 3), only three participants had values 
that exceeded 3.84, two of these participants were in the continuous condition and one 
from the final condition. Therefore, as Figure 3 illustrates, the large majority of values 
were non-significant. We summed the individual chi square values for each condition 
in order to gain some idea of differences between conditions. List 4 of the final 
condition just produced a significant chi square (χ2(20) = 32.164, p < .05). However, 
the total summed chi square value on list 4 in the continuous condition failed to reach 
significance (χ2(18) = 28.869, ns). (However it should be noted that the difference 
between the two conditions was really due to the inclusion of one participant in the 
final condition who produced a chi square value over 6 – see Figure 3). In the 
continuous condition we are able to examine if chi square values change across lists, 
the first three lists produced a significant summed chi square value (list 1: χ2(14) = 
35.999, p < .05; list 2: χ2(19) =52.938, p < .05; list 3: χ2(17) =41.038, p < .05). Note 
that a large proportion of these values were provided by a small number of 
participants who produced large chi square values in each condition.  
Correlation between chi square and recognition accuracy 
 
 
Figure 4. Experiment 4. Individual correlation scores between d-prime and chi square 
values for list 4 in the continuous condition (r = .083). 
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Figure 5. Experiment 4. The relationship between individual d-prime and chi square 
values for list 4 of the final condition (r = .090).  
 
A pearson product-moment correlation coefficient was computed in order to 
examine the relationship between recognition accuracy (d-prime values) and chi-
square values for performance on the fourth list of both the final and continuous 
conditions. This was only performed on data from the fourth list as, as stated 
previously, performance on this list was likely to produce better data and was 
theoretically of more interest. While positive, the correlation between d-prime and 
chi-square values on the list 4 of the continuous condition (see Figure 4) was very 
small and non-significant (r = .083, n = 16, p = .770). Similarly the correlation 
between chi-square and d-prime values on list 4 of the final condition (see Figure 5) 
was small and non-significant (r = .087, n = 19, p = .723). Overall indicating that in 
general no strong relationship between recognition accuracy and chi square values 
occurred.   
Discussion 
The results from experiment 1 indicate that participants could reasonably 
perform the task, but that this became more difficult as they proceeded. The pattern of 
RK judgments appeared to support the idea that recollected contents were more likely 
to accompany correct old decisions rather than false alarms, however with the 
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inclusion of the chi square analysis I was not able to reject the hypothesis that the 
majority of participants made recognition decisions and then assigned a R response to 
a proportion of those decisions independently of whether the decision had been a hit 
or a false alarm. That is I do not have evidence that recollection is driving the 
recognition decision for most of our participants. However there are limitations to the 
chi square analysis that should be considered when interpreting these results. First, it 
was necessary to eliminate any participant who did not make a false alarm, although 
by list 4 this was less of an issue as it was rare for a participant to avoid making a 
false alarm by list 4. In addition I often observed small cell values, which may affect 
the reliability of the analysis.  However, if I had applied Yates correction for small 
cell values then the obtained chi square values would have been smaller. I chose not 
to use the Yates correction in order to present a conservative case. 
In addition to the chi square results, I further examined a possible relationship 
between recognition performance as measured by d-prime values and chi square 
values. By the final list it is clear in both RK frequency conditions that there is no 
strong evidence of a relationship between chi square and d-prime values, rather a 
range of relationships appear possible. Importantly there are participants who were 
able to perform well on the recognition task and not produce high chi square values. 
In addition the individuals responsible for the highest chi square values in both 
conditions failed to produce large d-prime values. It does appear as though some 
participants can produce both reasonable d-prime and chi square values, however this 
does not describe the majority of participants. This further supports the idea that, 
while recollection may effectively be utilised by some participants, this does not 
appear to be the method by which the majority of participants completed the task.  
The results revealed a possible learning component to the RK task, such that 
participants who made RK judgments on every list were better able to perform the 
recognition task and were more likely to make accurate R judgments than participants 
who made RK judgments on the final list only. However on the first list, the analysis 
of hits revealed that the final group had an advantage as they were more likely to 
correctly respond old than participants who were making RK judgments for the first 
time in the continuous condition. Thus the results indicate that the extra task of rating 
subjective awareness is having an effect on the recognition task. It may be that simply 
informing participants that recollection and familiarity are involved in recognition 
memory affected their performance on list 1. In addition, it is possible that the process 
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of making judgments on each list made participants more stringent judges of their 
recognition decision.  
In experiment 5 all participants will be given RK instructions before list 1, this 
was done for a couple of reasons. First it enables me to separate the effects due to 
participants’ knowledge about familiarity and recollection from the effects due to the 
act of making RK judgments. Second it will make the larger retention interval 
between the study and test phases of list 4 unnecessary. Discrimination was generally 
much poorer on list 4 than the previous lists and, since we compare RK performance 
on this list only, it would be helpful to be able to have a more reliable comparison 
between groups and to prior lists. Furthermore there was no opportunity for 
participants to practice making RK decisions. Elsewhere there has been some concern 
that participants do not make RK decision in the manner in which the experimenter 
expects. That is, the judgments may reflect confidence rather than content (i.e., 
Donaldson, 1996). Thus in experiment 5, in both conditions, participants will perform 
a practice trial in order to make sure they have understood the instructions. The 
continuous group will again make RK judgments on all four lists, and participants in 
the final condition will not make them until the final list. Both groups will be told to 
follow test instructions carefully so that they know when they are required to make 
RK decisions. 
 
Experiment 5 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 40 students from the University of Queensland participated in the study. 
20 participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions (final or continuous). 
The variables to be measured were both RK decisions and recognition accuracy. 
Procedure and Materials 
The procedure and materials were the same as that used in experiment 4, except 
that participants first had a practice trial before the four lists to get to know the 
remember know paradigm. During the trial, five words were studied (a mix of three 
letter and ten letter words that were unrelated to any of the words used in the four 
lists) and then they were presented with ten words at test and were asked to make Old 
/New and R/K judgments as in experiment 4. When the practice trial was finished the 
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experimenter asked the participants as to what constituted a R or K response. When 
the experimenter was satisfied that participants understood the instructions then they 
continued on with the task. In the continuous condition participants were told that 
they would be asked to make RK judgments for all lists. Participants in the final 
condition were instructed that they would be informed in the instructions before each 
test list as to whether or not they would have to make RK judgments. 
Results 
Table 9. Experiment 5. Hits, false alarms and d-prime values broken down by list 
number and RK frequency condition. 
  RK Frequency 
  Continuous Final 
List 1 Hit 0.82 0.85 
 False Alarm 0.06 0.06 
 dʹ′ 2.42 2.55 
List 2 Hit 0.77 0.78 
 False Alarm 0.23 0.22 
 dʹ′ 1.51 1.56 
List 3 Hit 0.73 0.74 
 False Alarm 0.19 0.29 
 dʹ′ 1.49 1.21 
List 4 Hit 0.75 0.64 
  False Alarm 0.26 0.26 
 dʹ′ 1.34 1.00 
 
The analysis performed on d-prime values in experiment 4 was repeated on 
those values in experiment 5 (see Table 9). I found that the two groups did not differ 
significantly in accuracy as they did in experiment 1 (F (1, 33) = .254, p = .617, ns), 
however accuracy did again reduce significantly between lists (F (3, 99) = 35.163, p < 
001, MSE = .344, ηp2 = .516), follow up comparisons revealed that list 1 produced 
significantly more accurate recognition responses to all other lists and list 2 resulted 
in more accurate performance than to list 4 (p < .05), there was no significant 
difference in performance between list 3 and 4 (p = .214). Unlike experiment 4, I 
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failed to observe a significant interaction between RK frequency and list (F (3, 99) = 
1.446, p = .234, ns).  
I analysed the hits and false alarms separately as I did previously in experiment 4 
(see Table 9). I found hits decreased with every list (p < .05), except between list 3 
and 4 (p = .186). False alarms significantly increased from list 1 to list 2 (p < .05) but 
did not differ between lists after that. No other significant effects were observed.  
In summary, recognition performance was quite similar to experiment 4 as 
participants could still differentiate between old and new items, but with less accuracy 
as they continued through the task. In particular the declining hit rate across lists 
observed in experiment 4 was again observed in experiment 5. While there was some 
evidence that false alarms increased with each list, this effect was less dramatic in 
experiment 5. Unlike experiment 4, group differences were not significant. 
Remember-Know 
Table 10. Experiment 5. Mean proportion of RK judgments as a function of list 
number, recognition accuracy and RK frequency condition.  
 
  Continuous Final 
    R K R K 
List 1 Hit 0.46 0.36 - - 
 FA 0.01 0.04 - - 
List 2 Hit 0.55 0.22 - - 
 FA 0.11 0.13 - - 
List 3 Hit 0.47 0.26 - - 
 FA 0.09 0.09 - - 
List 4 Hit 0.52 0.23 0.38 0.26 
  FA 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.11 
 
R responses (see Table 10) were scored and analysed as they were in 
experiment 4. I again found a significant main effect of accuracy such that R 
responses were more likely to be made to hits (M = .45) than false alarms (M = .14), F 
(1, 33) = 59.06, p < .001, MSE = .029, ηp2 = .642. I also again found that groups did 
not differ overall (F (1, 33) = 1.04, p = .315, ns). However, as in experiment 4 a 
significant interaction revealed that that R responses were more accurate in the 
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continuous condition than in the final condition F (1, 33) = 4.338, p = .045, MSE = 
.029, ηp2 = .116.  
 
Figure 6. Experiment 5. Proportion of individual chi square values occurring in each 
value range broken down by list and RK frequency.  
 
See Figure 6 for a summary of chi square values produced by participants and 
note that again most chi square values were not significant. This time no participants 
managed a significant chi square value in the 2 – 4 value range. Due to the inclusion 
of some participants who produced very high chi square values, all summed chi 
square values reached significance. List 4 of the final condition produced a significant 
summed value, χ2(17) = 34.328, p < .05. Similarly the summed value of the final list 
of the continuous condition reached significance, χ2(14) = 60.931, p < .05. All other 
lists in the continuous condition again produced significant summed values (List 1: 
χ2(9) = 27.342, p < .05; list 2 χ2(14) = 39.660, p < .05; list 3 χ2(15) = 34.973, p < 
.05). Again, these large values were driven by a minority of participants. 
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Correlation between chi square and recognition accuracy  
 
 
Figure 7. Experiment 5. Individual correlation scores between d-prime and chi square 
values for list 4 in the continuous condition (r = .391). 
 
 
Figure 8. Experiment 5. Individual correlation scores between d-prime and chi square 
values for list 4 in the final condition (r = .344). 
Both RK accuracy conditions produced small positive pearson product-
moment correlations between d-prime and chi-square values on list 4.  While larger 
than experiment 4, both correlations again failed to reach significance r = .391, n = 
14, p = .167 (see Figure 7) in the continuous condition and r = .344, n = 17, p = .176 
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(see Figure 8) in the final condition. As illustrated in the scatterplots there are a small 
number of participants who produce high chi square and high d-prime values, while 
the majority of participants data falls to the bottom left quadrant of the figures.  
Discussion 
The RK data accurately replicates what was found in experiment 4. While in 
this experiment it was found that making RK judgments either on every list or on the 
final list did not affect recognition performance, the general way in which the 
recognition task was performed was quite similar to experiment 4. That is, there was a 
decrease in hit rate and a steady or increasing false alarm rate. Also similar to prior 
experiments participants accurately made R judgments so that they were more likely 
to occur to hits than false alarms. However, again our results did not support the idea 
that R judgments were associated with hits and thus there was no indication that R 
judgments were driving the recognition decision. The fact that R responses again 
differed between groups and this time without a corresponding difference in 
recognition accuracy indicates more strongly that some aspect of the RK task is learnt 
and that it does not necessarily have anything to do with the quality of content 
recalled, or the recognition decision.  
The individual chi square values again indicated that recollection was not 
driving the recognition response. While all conditions produced a significant summed 
chi square value this was usually due to the inclusion of a few participants who were 
able to produce large individual values. This makes a comparison between conditions 
quite difficult to interpret. However, it is clear that while the majority of participants 
did not produce a significant chi square value, a minority of participants can and 
sometimes these values can be quite large. Thus it is entirely possible that the 
recognition task can be achieved through content recollection, however this is not 
necessary for participants to complete the recognition task.  
The conclusion drawn from observing the chi square data is also supported by 
the result of examining the correlation between chi square and d-prime values. As in 
experiment 4, I again observed that not all participants are producing a relationship in 
line with a dual process perspective. Some participants produced low chi square and 
high d-prime values and some participants produced high chi square and low d-prime 
values (both indicating a negative relationship between the two). There are a minority 
of participants in both conditions who produced a very high score on both measures, 
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thus it is possible that a few participants were using content recollection in order to 
complete the recognition task. However, these small and non-significant correlations 
do not indicate a strong relationship overall between the two performance measures.   
 The design of experiment 5 allowed an easier interpretation of the results. That 
is, the initial practice trial enabled a closer examination the effect of awareness 
(regarding recollection and familiarity) and the effect of making RK judgments on 
recognition and R judgments. The inclusion of a practice trial further helped to rule 
out the possibility that participants did not understand how to correctly apply the RK 
task. Contrary to the results from experiment 4, group differences were not observed 
in recognition performance. However it was noted that R judgments were again more 
accurate in list 4 of the continuous condition compared to the final condition. The 
results of experiment 5 therefore raise the possibility that awareness of the two 
processes may have affected recognition performance, while the act of making 
judgments may affect accuracy of R judgments. However considering the variability 
of results usually afforded by the RK paradigm and the lack of replication, it would be 
premature to make any firm conclusions.  
While the majority of participants do not produce significant chi square 
values, there are some participants, notably in the continuous conditions who are able 
to produce large values. At this point it might be wondered what could be driving R 
responses. One way to ascertain what is driving R decisions is to simply ask 
participants to justify their R judgments. It has previously been noted that asking for a 
justification can affect the way in which participants make R judgments. Yonelinas 
(2002) informed participants that they may have to justify their R judgments after the 
task and found that participants were more likely to make more conservative R 
judgments. Similarly Mather, Henkel and Johnson (1997) found that participants who 
were asked to provide information about their R responses tended to make fewer R 
judgments. However, as we noted previously, Bodner and Lindsay (2003) did not note 
a difference in the way in which RK judgments were made when participants were 
asked to justify their decisions. A reasonable explanation of these differences is that 
in some tasks, like LOP tasks, the content that is recollected (a memory for how the 
item was processed) clearly ties the contents of recollection to the list.  However, in 
tasks without a difference in processing the contents of what is recollected may not be 
closely tied to occurrence in the list. If participants are aware that the content of their 
recollections are not closely tied to occurrence in the list then a requirement to 
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disclose the content of their recollections will encourage them to become more 
conservative with their R responses. It remains to be seen as to whether or not this 
will affect how accurate those decisions are or how tightly bound they are to the 
recognition decisions.  
 
Experiment 6 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 80 first year students participated in the study for course credit. 20 
participants were randomly assigned to one of four between subject conditions (final, 
final justification, continuous or continuous justification). The variables to be 
measured were both RK decisions and recognition accuracy. One participant did not 
understand the instructions properly and was excluded from the analysis, which 
resulted in 19 participants in the continuous justification condition. 
Procedure and Materials 
The procedure and materials were similar as that used in experiment 5, 
however participants were now asked to justify their R responses in the justify 
conditions. Participants in the justify conditions were also asked to justify their R 
responses during the initial trial phase. A sheet of paper was provided for participants 
next to their keyboards with a space for them to write the word in question and next to 
that to write down the details that accompanied their memories. Once they had made a 
R judgment they were given a prompt on screen to write down the details that 
accompanied that judgment.  
Results 
 Recognition 
Table 11. Experiment 6. Recognition results presented as hits, false alarms and d-
prime values broken down by list, RK frequency and justification conditions.  
 
  Continuous Final 
  Justification No Justification Justification No Justification 
List 1 Hit 0.85 0.86 0.89 0.94 
 FA 0.09 0.04 0.06 0.07 
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 dʹ′ 2.42 2.84 2.83 3.04 
List 2 Hit 0.78 0.75 0.82 0.83 
 FA 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.23 
 dʹ′ 1.58 1.45 1.60 1.80 
List 3 Hit 0.71 0.80 0.75 0.79 
 FA 0.18 0.19 0.31 0.28 
 dʹ′ 1.49 1.71 1.14 1.47 
List 4 Hit 0.67 0.71 0.61 0.71 
  FA 0.35 0.22 0.30 0.27 
 dʹ′ 0.87 1.36 0.75 1.18 	  
A 2 between RK frequency (continuous vs final) by 2 between justification 
(justification vs no justification) by 4 within (list) mixed ANOVA was conducted on 
d-prime scores (see Table 11). This analysis revealed a main effect of list such that 
accuracy declined across list (F (3, 225) = 121.598, p < .001, MSE = .363, ηp2 = .619), 
follow up comparisons revealed that all lists differed significantly (p < .05) except 
between lists 2 and 3 (p = .084). When I examined between group differences, I failed 
to find a significant difference in accuracy between the final and continuous 
conditions (F(1, 75) = .007, p =.933, ns) however, collapsing across RK frequency 
and list, participants in the no justification condition (M = 1.85) were more accurate in 
their recognition responses than participants in the justification condition (M = 1.58), 
F (1, 75) = 5.02, p = .028, MSE =1.144, ηp2 = .063. Despite not finding an effect 
overall for RK frequency, I did find a significant interaction between list and RK 
frequency F (3, 225) = 4.333, p = .005, MSE = .363, ηp2 = .055. In particular, follow 
up simple effects revealed that sensitivity was greater in the final conditions 
compared to the continuous conditions on list 1, though this difference was marginal, 
(p = .054). The groups did not differ significantly on any other list (p > .05).  
As in the previous two experiments I examined the pattern of hits and false 
alarms. Performing the same analysis as that applied to the d-prime data, I found that 
false alarms increased with each list (p < .05) and an analysis of the hit rates showed 
that hits decreased across lists as they did in the previous two experiments (p < .05). 
Follow up of a significant interaction between RK frequency and list revealed that the 
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continuous conditions produced fewer false alarms  (M = .19) than the final group  (M 
= .22) on the 3rd list (p = .004). No other significant effects were observed. 
In order to make the results of experiment 6 more comparable to previous 
experiments I examined the no justification conditions separately, however this 
analysis did not reveal anything new and is therefore not reported here. Similar to the 
results from experiment 4, a higher false alarm rate in the final condition compared to 
the continuous condition was noted, however this time this was only significant for 
list 3.  
While not evident in our analysis of hits, the analysis conducted on d-prime 
values indicates that the first list of the final condition produced marginally more 
sensitive recognition judgments than the same list of the continuous condition. This 
result was also similar to what I had found in experiment 4. Thus providing some 
evidence that recognition accuracy may be hurt by the inclusion of the RK paradigm 
even when recollected content is more likely to be criterial.  
I was also able to examine group differences that may have occurred between 
the two continuous conditions. A 2 justification (justification vs no justification) by 4 
within list mixed ANOVA on d-prime data and hits failed to reveal anything that 
might add to my previous analysis. However I did find a marginally significant 
interaction between list and justification when this analysis was conducted on false 
alarms, F (3, 111) = 2.655, p = .052, MSE = .015, ηp2 = .067. The trend in follow up 
comparisons of justify at each level of list, found that group differences approached 
significance on list 1 (p = .063) and list 4 (p = .068). Basically reflecting the trend for 
fewer false alarms in the no justify condition to the justify condition on list 1 and list 
4, which did not occur on list 2 or 3. 
Remember Know 	  
Table 12. Experiment 6. Mean proportion of RK judgments as a function of list 
number, recognition accuracy, RK frequency and justification condition.  
  Continuous Final 
  
Justification 
No 
Justification 
Justification 
No 
Justification 
    R K R K R K R K 
List 1 Hit 0.27 0.53 0.57 0.29 - - - - 
 FA 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.03 - - - - 
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List 2 Hit 0.20 0.55 0.61 0.15 - - - - 
 FA 0.04 0.18 0.14 0.11 - - - - 
List 3 Hit 0.17 0.51 0.65 0.15 - - - - 
 FA 0.03 0.20 0.10 0.09 - - - - 
List 4 Hit 0.15 0.49 0.53 0.19 0.21 0.40 0.43 0.29 
  FA 0.05 0.29 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.22 0.14 0.13 
 
A 2 between RK frequency (continuous vs final) by 2 between justification 
(justify vs no justify) by 2 within accuracy (hit vs false alarm) mixed ANOVA on R 
responses (see Table 12) made in list 4, revealed a significant main effect of accuracy 
such that R responses were more likely to occur for hits (M = .33) than false alarms 
(M = .10), F (1, 75) = 118.502, p < .001, MSE = .018, ηp2 = .612, thus replicating 
previous results from experiments 4 and 5. Accuracy interacted with justification such 
that better discrimination was observed in the no justify condition (M (R-hit) = .48, M 
(R-false alarm) = .14) than the justify condition (M (R-hit) = .19, M (R-false alarm) = 
.07), F (1, 75) = 28.110, p < .001, MSE = .018, ηp2 = .273. In addition, significantly 
more R responses were made in the no justify (M = .31) than justify conditions (M = 
.13), F (1, 75) = 30.161, p < .001, MSE = .042, ηp2 = .287. Therefore the results 
indicate that R responses were much more likely to be made when no justification of 
content recalled was required. As such, asking participants to produce proof of their 
recollected content severely limited their willingness to do so. It should be noted that 
the superior discrimination in the no justify than in the justify conditions may simply 
reflect a floor effect as R responses were so rarely made in the justify condition. 
The pattern of R responses made in the continuous condition did not differ 
significantly overall to R responses made in the final condition, F (1, 75) = 0, p= .982, 
ns. Accuracy did not interact with RK frequency, F (1, 75) = 1.214, p = .274, ns. Nor 
was there a significant interaction between the RK frequency conditions and 
justification conditions; F (1, 75) = 1.945, p = .167, ns, or between accuracy, RK 
frequency and justification F (1, 75) = 2.455, p = .121, ns. Separate analysis of the no 
justification conditions again did not reveal anything of interest and is therefore not 
reported.  
In order to examine differences that might occur with practice between 
justifying a R response and not justifying that response, I compared the pattern of R 
	   54	  
responses made in the two continuous conditions. A 2 between justification (no justify 
vs. justify) by 4 within (list) by 2 within accuracy (hits vs. false alarms) mixed 
ANOVA was applied to R responses. The analysis reflected results of the main 
analysis, which are not reported here. In addition to the expected results, it was further 
found that the justify conditions varied across block F (3, 111) = 4.370, p = .006, 
MSE = .013, ηp2 = .106. This significant interaction indicated that while R responses 
increased from list 1 to list 2 in the no justification condition, R responses decreased 
from list 1 to list 2 in the justification condition, thus possibly exhibiting that by the 
second list participants in the justification condition were aware that content was not 
helpful, while participants in the no justification condition were not.  
 
 
Figure 9. Experiment 6. Proportion of individual chi square values occurring in each 
value range broken down by list and RK frequency in the justification condition. 
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Figure 10. Experiment 6. Proportion of individual chi square values occurring in each 
value range broken down by list and RK frequency in the no justification condition.  
 
 As illustrated in Figures 9 and 10, the pattern of chi square values found in the 
previous two experiments was again replicated in experiment 6. That is, the majority 
of values fell between 0 and 2 and, therefore, the majority of values failed to reach 
significance. In Figure 9, one participant in the final condition produced a significant 
value in the 2 – 4 range, no other value included in that value range reached 
significance. In Figure 10 none of the participants managed a significant value in this 
range.  
Summing across participants I found fairly low chi square values in list 4 of 
the final conditions (final no justification (χ2(15) = 15.346, ns) and final justification 
(χ2(18) = 16.344, ns)). In the continuous justification condition the first two lists 
resulted in significant summed chi square values, while the final two lists failed to 
reach significance (list 1: χ2(9) =17.491, p < .05; list 2: χ2(13) =22.362, p < .05; list 3: 
χ2(13) = 13.040, ns; list 4: χ2(13) = 13.308, ns). In the continuous no justification 
condition all lists reached significance, (list 1: χ2(7) =35.243, p < .05), list 2: (χ2(16) 
= 65.877, p < .05, list 3: χ2(16) = 50.775, p < .05, list 4: χ2(14) = 33.024, p < .05). 
Again the significant chi square values were helped by the inclusion of a small 
number of large values with the majority of the individual chi square values being far 
0	  0.1	  
0.2	  0.3	  
0.4	  0.5	  
0.6	  0.7	  
0.8	  0.9	  
1	  
0_2	   2_4	   4_6	   6_8	   8_10	   10_12	  
cont	  L1	  cont	  L2	  cont	  L3	  cont	  L4	  Sinal	  L4	  
	   56	  
from significant. Note also that there are very few R judgments in the justification 
conditions so the chi square values in those conditions are likely to be less accurate 
than the chi square values in the other conditions. 
Correlation between chi square and recognition accuracy 
 
 
Figure 11. Experiment 6. Individual correlation scores between d-prime and chi 
square values for list 4 in the continuous no justification condition (r = .759). 
 
Figure 12. Experiment 6. Individual correlation scores between d-prime and chi 
square values for list 4 in the continuous justification condition (r = .177). 
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Figure 13. Experiment 6. Individual correlation scores between d-prime and chi 
square values for list 4 in the final no justification condition (r = .184). 
 
Figure 14. Experiment 6. Individual correlation scores between d-prime and chi 
square values for list 4 in the final justification condition (r = .003). 
A significant positive correlation between recognition accuracy and chi square 
performance was observed in the continuous no justification condition (see Figure 
11), r = .759, n = 14, p = .002, indicating that participants who performed well on the 
recognition task were also more likely to have large chi square values. All other 
conditions produced non-significant correlations: continuous justification (see Figure 
12), r = .177, n = 13, p = .555; final no justification condition (see Figure 13), r = 
.184, n = 15, p = .511 and final justification, (see Figure 14) r = .003, n = 18, p = .990.  
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Reported Content 
 A perusal of the type of recollections participants reported provides some clear 
evidence that recollected content was largely not useful in discriminating between 
lists on our task. There were some exceptions, for example a participant in the final 
justification condition utilised a strategy that may have been helpful. They chose one 
word from the study list and linked it to other words via a series of sentences. Others 
reported details about the recency (‘it was the last word in the list’) or primacy (‘it 
was the first word shown’) of the test item, which may have been helpful. A 
participant also noted that two words studied in succession started with the same 
letter, this may have been helpful in identifying one or both of these words correctly 
at test. However, the large majority of participants who wrote down their recollection 
reported basic observations at the time that have very little to do with distinguishing 
between lists (i.e., ‘Patrol’ – ‘I thought about soldiers’). Others stated that they 
recalled visualizing the items and others reported noting something orthographic 
about the item like the inclusion of a double letter. Sometimes participants made the 
observation that the repeated presentation of a word had reminded them of studying 
that word in a prior list. Sometimes this took the form of explaining that they had seen 
it a couple of times before or it is more specific and they say that they had seen it in 
the previous list. They also note down words that they feel they have not studied 
before until they studied that word in the prior list. In addition to this, in the 
continuous condition a few participants repeat the initial thought that they had about a 
particular word on subsequent tests. That is, to use a previous example ‘patrol’ – ‘I 
thought about soldiers’ would be repeated anytime a participant remembered studying 
the word patrol. This would not have been useful to them in identifying list 
membership for the item.  
Discussion 
The standard way of scoring RK data again indicated that R responses were 
made accurately, however again the chi square analysis showed that for the vast 
majority of participants there was no significant association between R responses and 
hits. As in the earlier experiments, it was found that recognition performance in the 
continuous condition was more accurate than the final condition. However, this was 
only significant on list 3. I also found that participants in the final conditions were 
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marginally more accurate on the recognition task in list 1 than participants in the 
continuous conditions. This same effect was observed in experiment 1 and there had 
been a slight trend towards this effect in experiment 2.  
Unlike the previous experiments a significant positive correlation occurred 
between d-prime and chi square values in the continuous no justification condition. A 
look at the scatterplot (Figure 11) of this data shows that four participants who 
performed very well on both measures largely drove the correlation. Given previous 
results such a strong correlation was surprising. A look at the correlations on previous 
lists in that condition showed that this was not a consistent pattern: list 3; r = .066: list 
2; r = -.228; list 1; r = .009. It is possible that the four participants who performed 
well on list 4 became progressively better at the task and failed to impact largely on 
the correlation prior to list 4. As in the prior experiments there was no clear pattern to 
the data, this is also evident by examining the other scatterplots, where again as in 
previous experiments, all relationships were possible between the two performance 
measures.  
Participants were more likely to make old/new decisions accurately and more 
likely to report R when they did not need to justify their R response. The decrease in 
responding R in the justification condition (particularly from list 1 to list 2), indicates 
that participants may have become aware that content was not helpful.  It is 
interesting that recognition performance was adversely affected in this condition. 
While it may be tempting to attribute this to greater retention intervals due to 
participants having to write down a justification for their R responses, when we 
consider how rarely participants made a R response in this condition then this 
explanation becomes extremely unlikely. Instead it appears more likely that this 
detriment to performance was due to some aspect of having to justify a R response or 
possibly through examining the information employed to make a R response.  
It was noted in experiment 5 that making participants aware of the RK task by 
incorporating an initial practice task may have been responsible for the failure to find 
a difference in recognition performance between the final and continuous conditions.  
Only a small difference was observed between these conditions in experiment 6 on 
one list, rather than a main effect. However a difference was observed between the 
justification conditions, such that the no justification condition resulted in more 
accurate recognition. Thus again, the manipulation of the RK task affected 
recognition performance, and in that case it must have been due to actually making 
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the judgments considering that all participants had been exposed to the task in the 
initial practice task.  	  
CHAPTER 4 
There is some evidence across all three experiments included in chapter 3 that 
when the RK task is introduced for the first time it can adversely affect performance. 
It is possible that the RK instructions are too suggestive. This not only poses a 
problem for the interpretation of RK data, but may also affect performance on the RK 
task and/or the recognition task. While there is some variation in these effects, the 
general trend is that recognition performance is negatively affected on list 1 in the 
continuous condition, while recognition and/or R judgments are more likely to be hurt 
by list 3 or list 4 of the final condition. The smaller effect on the first list is most 
likely due to the fact that content recollection is more likely to be criterial, whereas it 
is more likely to be noncriterial by the final list. Furthermore in experiment 6, being 
made to justify R responses negatively affected recognition performance compared to 
the standard RK response condition, which strongly supports the notion that the RK 
task can affect memory performance adversely, especially when content is not useful. 
There are a number of potential explanations as to why performance 
differences were observed between the continuous and final conditions. First, these 
differences may indicate a possible learning aspect to the RK task. That is, recollected 
content may be assessed differently if RK judgments are made on every list, as 
compared to just the final list. As I mentioned in the introduction, the instructions for 
the RK paradigm do not specify that discriminatory information must be retrieved to 
satisfy a R response, rather anything that pops into mind will do. It may be that on 
first using the RK task participants assume that any recollected content that comes to 
mind is accurate and hence on the final list this could only damage recognition 
performance. That is, by the final list the content that comes to mind may refer to 
studying or being tested on that same word in prior lists. Participants in the 
continuous conditions however, may become more astute reviewers of their own 
recollections. That is, they may have learnt not to uncritically accept anything that 
comes to mind.  
Differences between the continuous and final conditions may also be observed 
if participants are more likely to rely on recollection in the absence of familiarity 
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when initially presented with the RK task. In accordance with the idea that the RK 
instructions are suggestive, participants may be focusing on recalling content without 
necessarily focusing on the recognition task. It may be that participants in the 
continuous condition initially rely on recollection in the absence of familiarity but 
then, with practice, come to report recollection only when it is accompanied by 
familiarity. Relying purely on recollection in the fourth list in particular would 
adversely affect performance, as explained previously and in accordance with the 
results. The process of recollection on list 1, though more helpful than in list 4, may 
not always be as accurate in the absence of familiarity.  
Another alternative to consider is that making RK judgments may encourage 
participants to evaluate their recognition decisions, and this extra cognitive effort may 
be negatively affecting performance. Presumably, greater effort expended on 
evaluating the subjective experience of a recognition decision would be required on 
first encountering the RK task. On subsequent lists in the continuous condition the 
task may become less arduous. This possibility is supported by the fact that the 
increased effort required to justify a response also had deleterious affects on 
recognition performance. The concept of effort as described by Yonelinas and Jacoby 
(1996) may apply in source monitoring tasks or when two lists have been processed in 
two different ways. However, it is less clear as to how effort may be applied to an 
episodic recognition task.  
Thus the results from experiments 4, 5 and 6 indicated that it was likely that a 
combination of knowledge about recollection and familiarity and the act of making 
RK decisions was affecting recognition and/or RK performance. Furthermore it may 
be that in the continuous conditions participants might have relied on recollection 
only when items were first familiar, while participants in the final conditions may 
have been relying on recollection in the absence of familiarity. A final experiment 
was conducted in order to further examine these possibilities. 
 
Experiment 7 	  
Experiment 7 includes all four conditions previously utilised in experiment 1 
and 2 (RK frequency and RK response interval conditions). However there were some 
additional changes. Instead of a practice RK trial initially as had been employed in 
experiments 5 and 6, all participants made judgments on list 1. This allows a tighter 
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comparison of the effect of practice while allowing all participants to have the 
opportunity to understand the RK procedure. While participants in the continuous 
conditions continue to make RK judgments on all subsequent lists, participants in the 
interrupted condition will only make them again on list 4. Thus participants in the 
continuous condition will be practiced at making RK judgments on a list 
discrimination task, while participants in the interrupted condition will be practiced 
on the task, but not while also completing a list discrimination task. A longer study-
test retention interval is further re-introduced in experiment 7. The effect on the final 
list when participants were not practiced at making RK judgments was a lot smaller 
across experiments 5 and 6, however it may be that a longer retention interval may 
recover the effect, as it may be more noticeable under more demanding conditions.  
The inclusion of the delayed condition may help to clarify previous 
speculation. The addition of the RK task may encourage participants to rely on 
recollection, however participants in the delayed condition have already completed 
the recognition task by the time they attempt the RK task. It is also possible to 
separate the effects of RK knowledge from the act of making RK judgments by 
incorporating the delayed condition. If a decrement in performance is observed on the 
last list of the interrupted condition compared to the continuous condition, when 
judgments are made immediately and not at a delay, then the interpretation that the act 
of making judgments can affect R and/or recognition performance is supported. This 
would also support the idea that the effect on the final list is due to participants 
relying on recollection in the absence of familiarity. Furthermore, in the case that 
participants are only relying on recollection in the presence of familiarity in the 
continuous condition, then a difference in performance between the delayed and 
immediate continuous conditions would not be expected.  
The results of experiment 1 indicated that participants were unable to make 
RK judgments at a delay without overestimating prior old decisions on test 1. 
However, it is possible that the inclusion of a larger retention interval between the 
recognition test and the RK test may have been the reason for this poor performance. 
Or it could be that, as participants had no opportunity to practice the task, they 
became confused about when they should be responding R or K. It is further possible 
that such a task may be more achievable if participants are well practiced at making 
RK judgments at a delay. In particular practice at making RK responses when there is 
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a list discrimination task (lists 2, 3, and 4) may be important in allowing participants 
to calibrate their R responses.    
Method 
Participants 
A total of 92 participants from the University of Queensland, were included in 
the study. 23 participants were randomly assigned to one of four between subject test 
conditions (delayed: interrupted or continuous; and immediate: interrupted or 
continuous). The data from two participants was lost due to computer error leaving 46 
participants in the delayed conditions and 44 participants in the immediate conditions. 
For each RK response interval condition (delayed and immediate), an equal number 
of participants were included in each RK frequency condition (interrupted and 
continuous).  
Procedure and Materials 
All participants were instructed about the RK task after the first study list but 
before the first test list. In order to keep study and test interval constant across lists, 
test instructions remained on the screen for 50 seconds before each recognition test 
list across all conditions. The procedure and instructions for the delayed and 
immediate conditions were similar to experiment 1 however there were some changes 
made regarding when participants received instructions. As indicated previously all 
participants received RK instructions before the recognition test on list1. Further to 
this participants in the delayed continuous condition received a reminder about the 
RK task between the recognition test and the RK test, they also received clear 
instructions indicating that they were to describe their subjective experience only for 
the items they had just been tested on. Participants in the interrupted conditions were 
instructed before the recognition test phase of list 2 and list 3 that they would not be 
required to make RK judgments on the subsequent test phase. They were then 
instructed before the test phase of list 4 that they would be required to make RK 
judgments.  
Results 
Recognition 
Table 13. Experiment 7. Proportion of hits, false alarms and d-prime values broken 
down by list and RK response interval. 
	   64	  
 
 Delayed Immediate 
 Continuous Interrupted Continuous Interrupted 
List 1 Hit .861 .833 .791 .786 
 False Alarm .074 .137 .077 .102 
 D-prime 2.546 2.101 2.216 2.122 
List 2 Hit .804 .789 .775 .782 
 False Alarm .315 .339 .248 .348 
 D-prime 1.440 1.233 1.423 1.230 
List 3 Hit .794 .707 .727 .791 
 False Alarm .398 .417 .291 .418 
 D-prime 1.172 0.706 1.255 1.070 
List 4 Hit .752 .741 .736 .675 
  False Alarm .363 .367 .213 .402 
 D-prime 1.134 0.977 1.552 0.707 
 
In order to examine recognition performance d-prime values were calculated 
with the standard correction (see Table 13) and a 2 between RK frequency 
(interrupted vs continuous) by 2 between RK response interval (delayed vs 
immediate) by 4 (list; 1, 2, 3 4) mixed ANOVA was conducted on those values. As in 
previous experiments a main effect of list was observed (F (3, 258) = 59.060, p < 
.001, MSE = 0.477, ηp2 =. 407). Accuracy significantly (p < .05) decreased with each 
list except between list 3 and 4 (p = .606). Recognition performance across list did not 
differ significantly depending on RK response interval (F (3, 258) = 1.061, p = .366, 
ns) nor did performance differ across list depending on RK frequency (F (3, 258) = 
.726, p = .537, ns).  Collapsing across list and RK frequency, the delayed and 
immediate groups did not significantly differ (F (1, 86) = .048, p = .828, ns). 
However overall the continuous group (M = 1.59) was more accurate on the 
recognition task than the interrupted group (M = 1.27), (F (1, 86) = 4.455, p =.038, 
MSE = 2.120, ηp2 = .049). Recognition performance in the RK frequency conditions 
did not vary depending on RK interval condition, F (1, 86) = 0.001, p = .973, ns. 
However there was a significant three way interaction between list, RK frequency and 
RK interval, F (3, 258) = 2.733, p = .044, MSE = .477, ηp2 = .031.  
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A perusal of the data indicated that this was most likely to be the result of a 
difference in the RK frequency by list interactions at each level of the RK response 
interval conditions. Thus, the three way interaction was followed up by examining the 
interaction between list and RK frequency separately for the delayed and immediate 
group. The obtained values were adjusted so as to incorporate the correct error term 
and degrees of freedom from the initial model. As expected, a significant interaction 
in the delayed condition was not observed (Fadj (3, 261) = .615, ns). However the 
interaction between RK frequency and list was significant in the immediate condition 
(Fadj (3, 261) = 2.953, p = .033). Follow up simple effects of this interaction revealed 
that the continuous and interrupted conditions only differed significantly on list 4, 
specifically participants in the interrupted condition were less accurate than in the 
continuous condition (Fadj (3, 261) = 14.376, p < .001). The interrupted and 
continuous groups did not differ significantly on any other list, (p > .05). 
The analysis applied to the d-prime values was applied to the hits and false 
alarms. The large majority of each analysis reflected what was found in the d-prime 
analysis, with the exception of a marginally significant main effect of RK frequency 
found when examining the false alarms, F (1, 86) = 3.808, p = .054, MSE = .112, ηp2 
= .042. This reflected the fact that more false alarms were made in the interrupted 
conditions (M = .32) on average than in the continuous conditions (M = .25). Neither 
the analysis of the hits or false alarms revealed a significant three way interaction as 
had been observed in the d-prime analysis. 
Remember-Know 
Table 14. Experiment 7. RK judgments as a function of accuracy, list, RK response 
interval and RK frequency. 
  Delayed Immediate 
  Continuous Interrupted Continuous Interrupted 
    R K R K R K R K 
List 1 Hit .450 .333 .378 .359 .484 .307 .491 .295 
 FA .020 .037 .054 .043 .027 .050 .059 .043 
List 2 Hit .496 .230 - - .450 .325 - - 
 FA .183 .113 - - .125 .123 - - 
List 3 Hit .483 .243 - - .430 .298 - - 
 FA .191 .143 - - .159 .132 - - 
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List 4 Hit .459 .220 .333 .287 .459 .277 .464 .211 
  FA .154 .159 .139 .161 .118 .095 .243 .159 
 
A 2 between RK response interval (delayed vs immediate) by between 2 RK 
frequency (continuous vs interrupted) by 2 accuracy (hits vs false alarms) was 
conducted on R responses made on the final list only. A significant main effect of 
accuracy illustrated that participants made more R responses to hits (M = .43) overall 
than false alarms (M = .16), F (1, 86) = 87.809, p < .001, MSE = .036, ηp2 = .505. 
This effect of accuracy did not differ between the delayed and immediate conditions 
(F (1, 86) = .316, p = .575, ns), however the effect of accuracy did differ between the 
continuous and interrupted conditions, although this interaction was marginally 
significant (F (1, 86) = 4.188, p = .044, MSE = .036, ηp2 = .046). Follow up simple 
effects revealed that the interaction between accuracy and RK frequency resulted 
because participants were more accurate with their R responses in the continuous 
condition (mean difference between R-hit and R-fa: M-diff = .32) than participants in 
the interrupted condition (M-diff = .21) on list 4.  
Overall, delayed and immediate conditions did not differ significantly, (F (1, 
86) = 2.059, p = .155, ns; nor did the continuous or interrupted conditions, F (1, 86) = 
.007, p = .933, ns). However RK response interval and RK frequency conditions did 
produce a marginally significant interaction, F (1, 86) = 3.802, p = .054, MSE = .054, 
ηp
2 = .042. This interaction indicates that more R responses occurred in the 
interrupted than the continuous condition when judgments were made immediately 
(see Figure 14). However, in the delayed condition the trend went the opposite way, 
so that R responses were more likely in the continuous than the interrupted condition. 
The three way interaction between accuracy, RK response interval and RK frequency 
was not significant (F (1, 86) = .007, p =.933, ns).  
Chi-square 
A chi square analysis was also applied to the data here as it was in the three 
experiments reported in chapter 3. Again the large majority of participants failed to 
produce a significant chi square value (see Figure 15 and Figure 16). In the delayed 
condition (see Figure 15), only one participant in the continuous condition produced a 
significant value (exceeding 3.84) on the first list in the 2 – 4 value range. A 
participant in the interrupted condition also produced a significant value in the 2 – 4 
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range on the first list, however no other values were significant in this range. In the 
immediate condition (see Figure 16), two participants produced significant values in 
this range (one on list 2 and one on list 4), no other significant values occurred in this 
range.  
Despite the delay, the participants in the delayed conditions were still capable 
of occasionally producing large chi square values (see Figure 15) and on all but the 
third list, significant summed values were produced (list 1: χ2(10) = 29.596, p < .05; 
list 2: χ2(18) =57.234, p < .05; list 3: χ2(17) =20.504, ns; List 4: χ2(17) = 36.107, p < 
.05). While the first list in the interrupted condition was significant (χ2(17) = 35.041, 
p < .05), the summed chi square value on the final list of the interrupted condition was 
not significant, χ2(22) =14.671, ns.  
The immediate conditions produced similar summed chi square results to the 
delayed conditions. Only list 4 of the interrupted condition produced a non-significant 
summed chi square value, χ2(19) =25.342, ns. All other summed values were 
significant; immediate interrupted list1: χ2(11) = 24.507, p < .05; immediate 
continuous list 1: χ2(14) = 55.272, p < .05; list 2: χ2(21) =79.113, p < .05 list 3: χ2(20) 
=73.729, p < .05; list 4: χ2(19) = 42.466, p < .05). 
The summed chi square values we observed generally indicated that larger 
values were more likely to occur in the immediate than delayed conditions, this was 
more noticeable across the continuous conditions. A perusal of the summed chi square 
values indicate this, also a greater number of significant values occurred in the 
immediate continuous condition than the delayed condition. The number of 
significant values across lists for the delayed continuous condition were: 3, 4, 2, 3 (for 
list 1, 2, 3, 4 respectively). While for the immediate continuous the values were: 5, 7, 
8, 3. This is not unexpected considering that we might expect more of a relationship 
between recognition and RK judgments when made in quick succession rather than 
when a delay occurs between each decision.  
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Figure 15. Experiment 7. Individual chi square values as a function of RK frequency 
in the delayed condition. 	  
	  
Figure 16. Experiment 7. Individual chi square values as a function of RK frequency 
in the immediate condition. 
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Correlation between chi square and recognition accuracy 
 
Figure 17. Experiment 7. Individual correlation scores between d-prime and chi 
square values for list 4 in the continuous immediate condition (r = .355). 	  
 
Figure 18. Experiment 7. Individual correlation scores between d-prime and chi 
square values for list 4 in the interrupted immediate condition (r = .467). 
 
0	  1	  
2	  3	  
4	  5	  
6	  7	  
8	  9	  
10	  
-­‐0.5	   0	   0.5	   1	   1.5	   2	   2.5	   3	   3.5	   4	  
Chi	  Squ
are	  
Recognition	  Accuracy	  (dprime)	  
0	  1	  
2	  3	  
4	  5	  
6	  7	  
8	  
-­‐1	   -­‐0.5	   0	   0.5	   1	   1.5	   2	   2.5	   3	  
C
hi
 S
qu
ar
e 
Recognition Accuracy (dprime) 
	   70	  
 
Figure 19. Experiment 7. Individual correlation scores between d-prime and chi 
square values for list 4 in the continuous delayed condition (r = .337). 	  
 
Figure 20. Experiment 7. Individual correlation scores between d-prime and chi 
square values for list 4 in the interrupted delayed condition (r = -.030). 
A pearson product-moment correlation coefficient was computed in order to 
examine the relationship between recognition accuracy (d-prime values) and chi-
square values for performance on the final list of all four conditions. While positive, 
the correlation between d-prime and chi-square values on the list 4 of the continuous 
immediate condition (see Figure 17) was not significant (r = .355, n = 19, p = .136). 
The same correlation in the interrupted immediate condition (see Figure 18) produced 
0	  1	  
2	  3	  
4	  5	  
6	  7	  
8	  9	  
10	  
-­‐1	   -­‐0.5	   0	   0.5	   1	   1.5	   2	   2.5	   3	  
C
hi
 S
qu
ar
e 
Recognition Accuracy (dprime) 
0	  0.5	  
1	  1.5	  
2	  2.5	  
3	  
-­‐0.5	   0	   0.5	   1	   1.5	   2	   2.5	   3	   3.5	  
C
hi
 S
qu
ar
e 
Recognition Accuracy (dprime) 
	   71	  
a marginally significant correlation between recognition accuracy and d-prime 
performance (r = .467, n = 18, p = .051). There was no significant relationship 
between d-prime and chi square performance in the continuous delayed condition (r = 
.337, n = 16, p = .202) or the interrupted delayed condition (r = -.030, n = 22, p = 
.896).  
Discussion 
Differences were not noted between any of the conditions on the first list in 
terms of recognition accuracy or R judgments, and therefore all groups initially used 
the RK task in a similar manner. The pattern of results indicated that differences in 
recognition accuracy (between continuous and interrupted conditions) were noticed 
primarily when judgments were made immediately and not at a delay. Furthermore 
performance on the RK task was marginally more accurate in the continuous than the 
interrupted conditions (collapsing across RK response interval conditions). In addition 
participants tended to make a stronger association between hits and R judgments 
when RK judgments were made immediately rather than at a delay. However this was 
more evident in the continuous conditions as chi square values were generally quite 
low in the interrupted conditions (on list 4).  
The larger chi square values in the immediate conditions (and more notably in 
the continuous immediate condition) might be expected considering that some 
forgetting may occur in the delayed condition between the first and second test. Table 
9 compares how participants responded on test 1 (immediate recognition) and test 2 
(delayed RK) in the delayed condition. R and K judgments are summed to produce a 
hit or false alarm probability across each list for test 2 responses. As the data 
illustrates participants were slightly more conservative with their RK judgments at a 
delay, even in the interrupted conditions. However performance on the delayed test 
was quite good. Indicating that participants were likely to slightly underestimate prior 
old recognition decisions but were still reasonably accurate. 
Table 15. Experiment 7. Comparing old decisions on test 1 (recognition) and test 2 
(RK) in the delayed conditions. 
	   	  
Continuous Interrupted 
    R+K Recog R+K Recog 
List 1 Hit 0.783 0.861 0.737 0.833 
 FA 0.057 0.074 0.097 0.137 
List 2 Hit 0.726 0.804   
	   72	  
 FA 0.296 0.315   
List 3 Hit 0.726 0.794   
 FA 0.334 0.398   
List 4 Hit 0.679 0.752 0.620 0.741 
  FA 0.313 0.363 0.300 0.367 
	   	   	   	   	   	  Similar to previous experiments no overall strong relationship between chi 
square and d-prime values was evident in the data. A perusal of figures 17 – 20, 
indicates that in general the majority of participants fall close to the x-axis. Thus 
reflecting the chi square results, as most participants did not produce a large chi 
square value. The larger positive correlations often included one or two outstanding 
performances from individuals as occurred in experiment 6. Again there are examples 
of negative correlations, with some participants performing very well on the 
recognition task and not very well on the chi square task. In particular there are 
always a number of subjects with d-prime values greater than 1 with chi square values 
less than 2.  
The main results from experiment 7 indicate that R responses are not as 
correlated with hits in the delayed conditions as in the immediate conditions. In the 
delayed conditions it looks like there is a greater tendency for the recognition decision 
to drive the R response as opposed to the R response driving the recognition decision. 
As making the judgments at a delay did not affect performance on the final list in the 
interrupted condition and also chi square values were not as large in the continuous 
delayed condition. However, in the immediate continuous condition participants are 
performing quite well on the RK task and associating hits with R judgments – 
possibly indicating that they are not responding R unless the word is familiar, or that 
they are specifically looking for criterial or more information as participants may 
have in Mather et al., (1997) upon receiving the MCQ task.  
The results of experiment 7 are consistent with the idea that participants may 
be relying on recollection in the presence of familiarity in the continuous conditions 
but not in the last list of the interrupted conditions. The chi square analysis supports 
this, as does the significant three-way interaction and the failure to find a difference in 
recognition performance between delayed and immediate continuous conditions. The 
results were further consistent with the idea that a longer retention interval potentiates 
the effect of introducing the RK task for the first time on the final list. This effect was 
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not strong on experiments 5 and 6, however essentially creating a more demanding 
task may have strengthened the smaller trend evident in previous experiments.  
CHAPTER 5 	  
General Discussion 
Summary of Results 
In the experiments included in this thesis I examined the possibility that 
participants could adequately perform an episodic recognition task when content 
recollection and acontextual familiarity were no longer useful. In order to examine the 
role of recollected content, a list-specific task was used where words were randomly 
assigned as targets and distractors from the same pool of words for each study and test 
list. It was proposed that by the final list, the utility of acontextual familiarity and 
content recollection would be greatly reduced, thus if the task was still achievable 
then some other process must be responsible for performance. In order to provide a 
measure of content recollection I applied the RK paradigm. In addition, I was curious 
as to how noncriterial recollection might be reported, if at all, in such a design. The 
possibility that recognition performance or RK judgments might be affected by 
having participants well practiced at the task or not was also explored. 
The first three experiments included in chapter 2 indicated that, while 
discrimination tended to decrease with each list, most participants could reasonably 
perform the list-specific recognition task. In experiments’ 1 and 2 it appeared as 
though introducing the RK task on the final list dramatically increased false alarms 
and that the inclusion of the RK task on every list avoided this affect. However, it was 
possible that these effects were only noted in the final condition because of a longer 
retention interval between study and test on the final list (due to the introduction of 
RK instructions). The third experiment controlled for retention interval and this 
reduced but may not have eliminated the effect noted in the first two experiments. 
Across all experiments R responses were more likely to occur to hits than false alarms 
on the final list. This seemed odd given the lack of available content on the final list 
and also that this remained the case even in the final condition of experiments 1 and 2 
that also included a significant increase in false alarms.   
The next chapter included three experiments which all refined on the 
methodology of the initial experiments. Experiment 4 replicated and extended on 
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experiment 3 by including a continuous condition. A decrement to recognition 
performance in the final condition compared to the continuous condition was 
observed. It was also observed that R responses were more likely to accompany hits 
than false alarms overall, however this time, the effect was greater in the continuous 
condition. It is possible that an effect was noted in experiment 4 and not experiment 3 
because the continuous condition was more likely to result in more accurate 
recognition, thereby increasing the performance differences between groups on the 
final list. 
When we introduced a practice trial on experiment 5 in order to eliminate the 
longer retention interval on the last list, we failed to note recognition differences 
between groups however R responses again were more likely to be accurate in the 
continuous than the final condition. Experiment 6 included a justification condition. 
When participants had to justify their responses they were less likely to respond R and 
their recognition performance was not as accurate as it was in the no justification 
conditions. In addition, small differences were noted between the continuous and final 
conditions however this effect was not as large as we had observed in experiment 4. 
The final experiment included in chapter 4 helped to clarify previous results. 
Instead of a practice task, participants in all conditions made RK judgments on the 
initial list. In the continuous condition, participants are practiced on the RK task while 
performing a list discrimination task, whereas the interrupted condition only has 
practice on the task without list discrimination (on list 1). In addition, the longer 
retention interval of experiments 3 and 4 was included on every list. The objective 
was to see if the longer interval potentiated the effect on final list recognition 
performance when making RK judgments for the first time. Results were consistent 
with this. Also reduced performance on the final list in the interrupted condition was 
only evident when RK judgments were made immediately rather than at a delay. This 
result was consistent with the idea that participants may be relying on recollection in 
the absence of familiarity on that task. In addition, similar to previous experiments, it 
was again found that R responses were more accurate on the continuous than final 
conditions.  
In the last four experiments of the thesis we applied a chi square analysis to 
RK judgments. The results of this analysis indicated that the vast majority of 
participants were not more likely to associate R to hits rather than false alarms. 
However a minority of participants were capable of producing a significant value, 
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thus it is possible that content recollection was useful for some participants. In 
particular this was noted in the continuous conditions. We further examined the 
correlation between individual d-prime and chi square scores for list 4 of the last four 
experiments. While most of these correlations were positive and therefore inline with 
a dual process interpretation, they were usually small and only positive due to a small 
number of participants who performed very well on both measures. In addition to this 
there were a number of participants who exhibited no relationship between d-prime 
and chi square values. It was also possible for participants to perform quite well on 
the d-prime task without producing a significant chi-square value. In general there 
was no convincing evidence that a dual process understanding of recollection was 
necessary to perform the task. Rather some participants produced data congruent with 
that interpretation, but the majority of participants did not.  
There were some very clear trends across all seven experiments. Performance 
gradually declined with each list. The introduction of the RK paradigm on the first or 
final list tended to negatively affect recognition performance, although this was more 
pronounced on the final list and when RK judgments were made immediately. R 
judgments were more likely to be accurately made in the continuous than final groups 
and when no justification was required. Furthermore R judgments were more likely to 
be associated with hits when judgments were made on every list and when those 
judgments were made immediately rather than at a delay.  
Main Conclusions 
Across all experiments we have observed that R responses are made more 
often to hits than false alarms. However, our chi square analysis tends not to support 
the idea that recollection is more helpful for hits than false alarms for the majority of 
our participants. This is further supported by an examination of the contents of 
recollection in experiment 6. What is more likely is that the difference observed 
between hits and false alarms is driven by accuracy of recognition and not greater 
sensitivity (of applying R to hits rather than false alarms). For the few participants 
that produced significant chi square values and hence were more likely to associate R 
judgment with hits, there are a number of possible explanations. Some participants 
may have engaged in learning strategies, such as assigning a list number to the words 
in each list. In a similar way participants may have strung words in one list together 
with sentences or, as one participant reported in experiment 6, choosing one word per 
list by which to relate all other words in the list. All of these examples would count as 
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instances of content recollection. In a manner similar to the scenario outlined by 
Donaldson (1996), it is further possible that some participants were relying on strong 
feelings of familiarity and were reporting that as R as opposed to K. However it is 
important to note that only a few participants could have been relying on content 
recollection or the use of familiarity to discriminate between R and K responses. Thus 
there is no indication that this is the natural or the usual way of performing the task. 
The expectation is that a R judgment will tend to reflect the presence of 
qualitative content, however it is an inference that this recollected content is driving 
the recognition response. The data does not tend to support the idea that content was 
useful for the majority of participants however I cannot absolutely rule out the 
involvement of content. Nor does the chi square analysis ultimately prove that the 
content reported by participants even with a high chi square value was ultimately 
what enabled them to perform the recognition task. The correlations help to support 
this idea however, again, can provide nothing definitive in this regard. Rather these 
measures can be either congruent or incongruent with a dual process understanding of 
content recollection. In this way these measures can assist in deciphering whether 
content was reported in a way that supports the idea that content was useful in the 
recognition task or not. The ultimate conclusion to be drawn from my data is that 
some participants perform in a manner that is congruent with a dual process 
understanding of recognition performance, however this did not describe the majority 
of the data. In addition to this, some participants produced data congruent with the 
idea that content recollection was not necessary in order to perform the task.  
There are a number of indications present in the data that there are certain 
limitations to the RK task, especially when employed in a multi-list design. For 
example, it was clear that participants were labeling noncriterial recollection as a R 
experience. This can be concluded for a number of reasons. First, R judgments were 
made to false alarms, in which case any recollected content would had to have been 
noncriterial. In addition, by the final list recollected content would be largely 
unhelpful however participants still willingly reported R. In experiment 6 we further 
found that when participants did not have to justify their R judgments then they were 
more likely to say R on the second than the first test list (when information would be 
more noncriterial). However when they had to justify their response then they were 
less likely to say R on the second test list. However, even though participants were 
potentially more aware that content was unhelpful in the justification condition, they 
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still willingly reported content that was not criterial. It is therefore possible that 
participants willingly report noncriterial recollection, largely as a result of a motive to 
comply with the RK instructions. Participants may be more able to comply with the 
RK instructions I used as these instructions do not specifically indicate that only 
criterial recollection should be reported. This is consistent with previous findings that 
R responses are made to false alarms (Roediger and McDermott, 1995), and is also 
consistent with the interpretation of the Bodner and Lindsay (2003) results outlined in 
the introduction, that R judgments may be made to noncriterial recollection.  
Another indication that the task was not working in the list-specific paradigm 
was that participants who were well practiced at the RK task (in the continuous 
conditions), were more accurate with their R judgments on list 4 compared to the final 
condition. In addition to this, it was often observed that recognition performance was 
improved in the continuous conditions compared to the final conditions. This effect 
was due to both diminished performance on the last list in the final condition and also 
to improved performance on the continuous condition, not just by the final list, but as 
a whole and sometimes on prior lists.  
Some consideration was given to whether the difference observed between the 
continuous and final conditions occurred simply due to awareness of the RK task. 
Being aware of a possible role for recollection and familiarity may have led 
participants to approach the recognition task in a way that they ordinarily would not 
have. It was also considered that differences may have resulted from the more active 
component of making RK judgments (which must necessarily also include a role for 
awareness). In experiments 1 – 4, participants in the final condition were not made 
aware of the RK task until right before the fourth test list. When the RK practice task 
was introduced on experiment 5, the only group difference observed was that R 
responses were more accurate in the continuous than final condition. Thus when all 
participants were made aware of the RK task initially, we did not observe the effect of 
less accurate recognition performance on the last list of the final condition compared 
to the continuous. This indicated a role for awareness in the RK task, although it 
should also be noted that the retention interval for list 4 in experiment 5 was not as 
long as it was in the first four experiments and in experiment 7. 
While it is likely that awareness of the task played a role, the changes we 
observed on later experiments provide a stronger indication that actively making RK 
judgments also affected the task. For example, more accurate recognition 
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performance was noted on list 3 in the continuous condition compared to the final 
condition in experiment 6 even though all participants were knowledgeable about 
recollection and familiarity. In addition, participants who were asked to justify their R 
responses performed more poorly on the recognition task than participants who were 
not asked to justify their responses in experiment 6. Both groups were knowledgeable 
about the proposed role of recollection and familiarity in recognition and therefore a 
change in the way judgments were made must have played a role in performance. The 
effect of making RK judgments was further observed in experiment 7 where 
judgments were made at a delay or immediately. The results indicated that 
performance was negatively impacted by RK decisions in the final list only when 
those judgments were made immediately and not when they were made at a delay.  
A possible reason for the observed detriment to performance on the final list 
when the RK task is introduced for the first time could conceivably be explained if we 
consider that participants may be relying on recollection in the absence of a 
contextual or differential familiarity. That is, in the case that participants are focusing 
on recollected content to inform their recognition decisions and doing this without 
using contextual familiarity, then, especially by the final list, this would not be 
helpful. If participants are relying on a contextual familiarity then anything 
recollected that comes to mind is going to be more likely to have occurred within that 
list-specific context. If participants are not relying on contextual familiarity, than 
anything recollected to the item may have occurred at any prior study or test list. It is 
reasonable to consider that participants may have been focused on recollecting 
content rather than relying on any contextual familiarity due to the suggestibility of 
the RK instructions. Participants who make RK judgments on every list may, with 
practice, come to report recollection only when it is accompanied by familiarity. The 
stronger association present between R judgments and hits in the continuous than the 
final conditions supports this. 	   
The possibility that participants in the continuous conditions learn to make R 
judgments only when recollection is accompanied by familiarity was supported by the 
results of experiment 7. Participants in the delayed condition made recognition 
judgments first and then made R judgments on a following test. As such those 
participants were not encouraged to rely on recollection when they made recognition 
judgments. Performance did not differ greatly between the continuous conditions 
(delayed and immediate) when it came to recognition accuracy thus supporting the 
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idea that participants in the continuous immediate condition were making R 
judgments only when familiarity was present. However, a difference in recognition 
performance was noted between the delayed and immediate conditions in the 
interrupted condition. Specifically, performance was negatively affected when RK 
judgments were made immediately on the final list of the interrupted condition but not 
when those judgments were made at a delay. Thus supporting the idea that 
participants in the immediate condition were relying on recollection in the absence of 
familiarity, while participants in the delayed condition were not.  
There was some indication from the data that supported the idea that 
participants were more likely to use the recognition response to drive the R judgments 
in the delayed condition than they were in the immediate condition. For example the 
result of the significant three-way interaction is congruent with the idea that 
participants in the immediate conditions are using R judgments to inform their 
recognition opinion. Obviously when they are not practiced on that, then this is 
detrimental to performance. In the delayed condition participants have to make the 
recognition judgment first and therefore are not affected by the inclusion of the RK 
task.  The greater incidence of forming a strong association between R judgments and 
hits in the continuous immediate condition than the continuous delayed condition 
further supports the idea that participants in the immediate conditions were using the 
R judgment to inform their recognition decision. In this case, as speculated 
previously, relying on recollection in the presence of familiarity may improve the 
usefulness of recollection. It could also be that participants in the continuous 
immediate condition are searching for more information before making a recognition 
decision. Both of these processes would result in a higher association between R 
judgments and hits. 
The increased false alarm rate on list 4 of the final condition compared to the 
continuous condition in experiment 7 was the first time since introducing a practice 
task on experiment 5 that we noted that particular effect.  There were two differences 
in the design of experiment 7 and that was that there were longer retention intervals 
and participants made RK judgments on list 1 and list 4. It is possible that participants 
in the interrupted condition, without having practice on the RK task during a list 
discrimination task, approached the task in the same manner they did on list 1. That is 
if participants relied on recollection in the absence of familiarity on list 1 then this 
may have been useful considering that any content recalled would be likely to be 
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criterial. However on list 4 most recollected content would have been noncriterial so 
maintaining the list 1 approach would not have been helpful. In addition to this, as has 
been stated previously, the longer retention interval may have revealed the effect 
more clearly as this would have made the task more difficult.  
Another alternative to consider is that making RK judgments may encourage 
participants to evaluate their recognition decisions, and this extra cognitive effort may 
be negatively affecting performance. Presumably, greater effort expended on 
evaluating the subjective experience of a recognition decision would be required on 
first encountering the RK task. On subsequent lists in the continuous condition the 
task may become less arduous. Mather et al., 1997 found that when memory was 
more evaluated then it tended to improve recognition. In Mather et al., (1997) 
memories were more evaluated in the MCQ condition than the RK condition, as the 
MCQ forced participants to consider a number of specific attributes of their memory 
for the item, while the RK task asked for more global information. However we found 
that when there was greater evaluation in the justification condition, recognition 
performance was less accurate. It may be that when recollected content is not useful 
then putting greater effort into that recollection may be harmful. This process may be 
similar to what Reder et al., (2000) assumed was responsible for their discovery that 
list discrimination performance was reduced when participants were asked to make a 
list discrimination judgment after saying old compared to a group who were only 
asked to make a list discrimination judgment after responding R. Reder et al., (2000) 
proposed that when the requirement to make a list discrimination when there was no 
memory trace to support it added interference to the task. In the case of my results, 
this might be considered similar to the notion of recollection without familiarity. 
The effects of the RK paradigm in the experiments reported here are likely to 
be inflated due to the difficulty of the task and the effects may not be as large in 
single list studies. However it is not the size of the effect that is of interest, but rather 
that an effect can be detected. By utilising a demanding task it was possible to expose 
small effects that may be present but not always obvious in less demanding tasks. In 
support of this in some of the experiments it was sometimes observed that 
performance on the first list was diminished by the inclusion of the RK task. It is 
reasonable that the smaller difference observed for the first list is due to the fact that 
recollection is more likely to be criterial than on the final list and there the effect was 
much larger.  
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The results at the very least indicate boundary conditions for the RK 
paradigm. That it was an issue in the list-specific task I employed in this thesis adds to 
the previous issues listed with the RK task in the introduction. While finding a new 
limitation for the task is not unexpected, it is also not insignificant. Changes brought 
about by the inclusion of the RK task indicate certain things about the nature of 
content recollection. That is, that it is not always relied upon in order to complete an 
episodic task, that it may not be helpful in the absence of familiarity and further to 
this, participants can possibly be trained to rely upon it. Note that the assumption is 
that R judgments are mostly a reflection that content has come to mind, the failure of 
the task that I refer to is that the process of making RK judgments appears to not be a 
simple reflection of two processes as has been previously assumed, rather it appears 
to be much more active than that. This holds some interesting implications for 
previous findings, that is, that it may simply be task attributes that direct in what 
manner participants rely on content recollection or not, and that content recollection is 
not always required for a particular task over another.   
Exploring a role for acontextual familiarity and other methods for completing the 
task. 
I assumed that my task manipulations would greatly reduce the utility of 
acontextual familiarity, however it may be argued that acontextual familiarity was 
greater for more recently viewed items. Although possible, the current assumptions 
and data regarding the role of acontextual familiarity in recognition memory does not 
support the idea that acontextual familiarity decays rapidly enough to be of use in the 
paradigm I used. An assumption commonly made in the literature is that one can 
manipulate the usefulness of acontextual familiarity by manipulating frequency, (i.e., 
Heathcote, 2003; Weeks et al., 2007, Yonelinas, 1999). For example, Weeks et al. 
(2007) assumed that more frequently occurring words may reduce the subjects 
reliance on familiarity to perform a recognition task. They repeated items across three 
lists randomly interchanging old and new items. All words were studied in pairs, 
while at test some items were presented for a single item recognition test, while other 
items were tested in pairs (intact or rearranged). For the single test items, they found 
similar results to ours, in that d-prime values tended to decrease while the false alarm 
rate significantly increased from list 1 to list 2.  However, in pair recognition false 
alarm rates declined across lists. This result supports the idea that for list 1, 
participants were using the familiarity of the items in the pairs as a basis for 
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responding intact even though item familiarity was the same in intact and rearranged 
pairs. However, this use of familiarity decreased in subsequent lists as all of the items 
became more familiar. Thus participants appear to be aware that manipulations of 
frequency impair the ability to use familiarity in a list discrimination task.  
It further does not appear that others would expect familiarity to decay quickly 
in my task. In his third experiment Yonelinas (1999) had participants study two lists 
with items repeated in the first list so as to equate familiarity across both lists. This 
was done in order to make it difficult for participants to use familiarity to differentiate 
between the lists and thus it was expected that participants would rely on recollection 
in order to complete the task (Yonelinas, 1999). Yonelinas (1999) also examined a 
situation where he thought that participants would use acontextual familiarity to 
recognize the words from the most recent list.  However, to do this he used an inter-
list interval that was far longer than ours. In experiment 4, participants studied list 1 
on day 1 and then list two on day 5. The source-monitoring test was presented 
immediately after learning list 2 on day 5. He found a curvilinear ROC, which he 
interpreted as evidence that acontextual familiarity was relied upon.  
The assumption made that acontextual familiarity could not have decayed fast 
enough to be useful in the list specific task I employed is further supported by 
Tulving’s (1985) assumptions about his retention interval manipulation. In his second 
experiment, Tulving (1985) found that R judgments were relatively less likely than K 
judgments after a 7-day retention interval. Tulving’s interpretation was that correct 
recognition judgments at this delay were based on familiarity not recollection. 
Although this assumption may be necessary if one wants to maintain that familiarity 
has a large semantic component this does not necessarily rule out a short lasting 
component. To the best of my knowledge there is no current consensus regarding how 
quickly acontextual familiarity might decay.  
While the predominant opinion is that acontextual familiarity does not decay 
rapidly enough to play a role in our experiments very little has been published about 
how quickly acontextual familiarity might decay. Experimental data has supported 
both that acontextual familiarity decays slowly and rapidly. Yonelinas and Levy 
(2002) using a source monitoring framework with process dissociation instructions 
found that familiarity declined while recollection remained stable over short retention 
intervals. However, Yonelinas (1994) found that familiarity remained stable while 
recollection declined. These inconsistencies have not been addressed and until they 
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are it is difficult to make predictions about how quickly acontextual familiarity 
decayed in our task.  
One further consideration, is that there is an assumption evident in discussions 
on the usefulness of familiarity as recency, and that is that one process must decay 
faster than the other (ie familiarity or recollection). In this regards, an alternative to 
considering a remaining role for familiarity is to consider that in general there was 
forgetting for both targets and distractors. In response to the different pattern of 
forgetting in Yonelinas (1994) and Yonelinas and Levy (2002), Weeks et al., (2007) 
tested the Yonelinas and Levy (2002) assumption that a rapid loss of item familiarity 
was responsible for the decline in pair false alarm rate. As previously outlined, the 
results indicated that the use of familiarity decreased in subsequent lists as all of the 
items became more familiar.  In addition to this, Weeks et al., (2007) noted no 
evidence of reduced forgetting in source monitoring because both hits and false 
alarms declined at the same rate, indicating that both targets and distractors were 
being forgotten. Thus conclusions about rates of forgetting when both hits and false 
alarms are declining are problematic.  While a role for acontextual familiarity can not 
be completely ruled out there are other alternatives for how participants may have 
performed the task.  
A possible role for contextual familiarity 
The difference between contextual familiarity and acontextual familiarity is 
that for the latter the decay process is closely tied to the retention interval, whereas 
contextual familiarity may not be closely tied to the retention interval if there is an 
opportunity to reinstate the study context (i.e., Humphreys, Bain and Pike, 1989). 
Contextual information may be provided by the instructions (‘do you remember the 
list of words I showed you last week?’).  Participants may also spontaneously 
reinstate aspects of the study context such as the physical environment (Smith and 
Vela, 2001) or a face paired with the study word (Starns & Hicks, 2013).  In Dennis 
and Humphreys (2001) it was proposed that the current context could be useful under 
conditions where reinstating a list context might be difficult. Participants may have 
been able to reinstate a previous context or to use the current context in order to 
complete the list specific task. Thus, items in the last list may be more familiar 
because the context stored with those items matches the context the participant is 
using, not simply due to the length of the retention interval.  
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An alternative to a decay process is considering a role for contextual change.  
Using a semi-continuous distractor paradigm, Averall and Heathcote (2011), noted 
that under explicit and implicit retrieval instructions the observed rate of forgetting 
was rapid but the curve was almost identical for both instruction conditions. That is 
they were forgotten at the same rate. While forgetting was rapid in Averall and 
Heathcote (2011), Dennis and Humphreys (2001) noted almost no forgetting in their 
list length experiment. In the long condition participants received three lists of study 
items with 3 minutes of puzzle occurring before list 1, more of the same puzzle 
activity between lists, and still more following the last list. This was followed by a 
recognition test for items in list 1 and list 3. There was very little difference in 
performance between items from the two lists, despite the fact that one list was a lot 
more recent than the other. These discrepant results suggest a role for contextual 
change. That is Dennis and Humphreys tried to make contextual reinstatement easy 
by inserting the same distractor task before and after each of the three lists.  In 
contrast in the semi-continuous distractor paradigm employed by Averall and 
Heathcote (2011) participants have no idea about how far back in time the test item 
occurred so they cannot reinstate an earlier context.  
I do not have a lot of direct evidence to support the idea that contextual 
familiarity was responsible for the remaining ability for participants to perform the 
recognition task. However there is some indirect evidence from other studies that 
participants could use relational information (between the item and context) to 
discriminate between conditions when recall could not possible be useful. If this is 
correct then the relationship between an item and the context it occurred in may also 
be available in the absence of recall/recollection. There are two papers which show 
that results that had previously been interpreted in terms of recollection  (Diana & 
Reder,2006; Reder et al., 2000) occurred when recollection was unlikely. Using the 
maintenance rehearsal paradigm, Humphreys et al (2010) showed that participants 
could distinguish intact from rearranged pairs and had higher hit rates for low 
frequency words than for high frequency words in single item recognition. This 
occurred with a level of learning that was so low that recall/recollection seemed 
highly unlikely.  These results were further supported and expanded upon by 
McFarlane and Humphreys (2012). The most interesting finding for our purpose was 
that there was a significant decrease in the FAR with no decrease in the HR.  The 
standard explanation for a decrease in the FAR is the use of recall to reject (Xu and 
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Malmberg, 2007).  However, that was not possible in McFarlane and Humphreys 
(2012) because a subsequent experiment showed that recall was almost non-existent. 
Instead McFarlane and Humphreys (2012) proposed that under some conditions the 
FAR would decrease when the strength of the parent pairs increased.  
A role for context is further supported by the results of Humphreys and 
Bowyer (1981). Humphreys and Bowyer (1981) found that recognition after studying 
weakly associated pairs of words was more similar to recall than it was to recognition 
after studying single words. The main implication was that participants came to rely 
on relational information (being able to recall the word which the target had been 
paired with during the study phase) and thus ignored item information or familiarity.. 
So the act of recalling is a potential basis for responding old but it is not the content of 
what is recalled that is driving the response. Humphreys and Bowyer (1981) proposed 
that the reason participants rely on recall us because recall is contextually dependent 
so that there is a strong tendency to either recall the paired word or nothing is 
recalled.  They also noted that with weak associates recall is very good so that little is 
lost by ignoring item information or familiarity.  
 The results from experiment 7 provide evidence that supports the Humphreys 
and Bowyer (1981) interpretation and also the idea that context is important. That is, 
my conclusion from the results of that experiment was that recollection was only 
accurate when it was accompanied with a contextual familiarity. The idea that content 
recollection happens yet is not pivotal to a list discrimination task is at odds with the 
dominant idea behind dual process theory, that is, that the content of what emerges 
into consciousness enables one to make a reasonably valid inference that the word 
occurred in the list or in a particular source. The SMF also makes this inference.  
Further the inference from the PDP is that recollection is driving the recognition 
decision, however it appears from experiment 7 that contextual familiarity can also 
drive the recognition decision.  
Autonoesis as a defining characteristic of episodic memory. 
There are a number of considerations to be made regarding Tulving’s (1983) 
theory of declarative memory. Our results in conjunction with the Humphreys et al. 
(2010) results and the McFarlane and Humphreys (2012) results indicate that there 
may be a feeling of familiarity (knowing) that incorporates relational information 
without the subjective experience of remembering (self-knowing). It has been argued 
that autonoesis must be present, as simply ‘knowing’ the contents of an episode, 
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would not be counted as episodic (Tulving, 2005; Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007). 
Since there was no indication that autonoesis was helpful in our task, the type of 
contextual familiarity I have indicated may be operating in our task may not be 
considered truly episodic. However, I have already argued that our task was episodic 
though it does not follow that all episodic tasks are solved in the same way or by the 
same memory system. If this is the case then it may be, that like Clayton, Yu and 
Dickenson’s (2001) scrub-jays, participants in our study utilised ‘episodic-like’ 
memory (knowing ‘www’ without autonoesis), however it is unclear at this point how 
helpful that distinction is. That is, I might wonder whether there is a principled reason 
for calling a memory, accompanied by autonoesis, episodic while not calling a 
memory that distinguishes between episodes but which is not accompanied by 
auotnoesis, episodic.  
Can the Recollection of Semantic Content be assigned to a Specific Episode? 
The possibility that participants may have confused their semantic reaction to 
a test word with a memory for having that same reaction at study does not fit well 
with Tulving’s (1983; 2005) theory. An examination of the written responses made by 
participants in the justification conditions of experiment 6 illustrates that these 
responses can include semantic content. Semantic content can come to mind any time 
the word that produces that response is encountered. For example the following is just 
a sample of some of the associative words that participants reported thinking about at 
the time of study: patrol – soldiers, leather – cows, elbow – forearm, chaos - 
apocalypse, surgeon – Grey’s Anatomy. The involvement of semantic memory 
occurring as recollection raises the question as to whether participants can 
discriminate their semantic reaction when that word is being tested from the memory 
for having a semantic reaction when that word was studied. There is indirect evidence 
from our data that indicates this type of confusion may occur. R responses were often 
made to false alarms in our study and this is not so surprising considering that 
participants are not equipped with many cues to enable them to judge whether they 
had reactions to items in the immediately prior list or items appearing in any of the 
prior lists. That is, there are few cues available that might help them judge the time of 
their reaction and participants don’t seem to be well equipped to always know when 
their reaction to the word occurred and sometimes falter. This is further supported by 
the results of Higham and Vokey (2004), who found that R responses increased when 
participants didn’t first make a recognition decision. This indicates that participants 
	   87	  
may be recollecting from other lists or previous encounters with that item, or 
confusing a reaction at test with a reaction at study.  
It is possible these intrusions were reactions that participants had at test rather 
than memories they had for the reaction at study. There is no direct evidence of this 
from the data, however Conway (1995) reported on one patient (AKP) who appeared 
to confuse thoughts he had for the first time when he encountered a test item with a 
memory for those thoughts from the time of study. On a recognition task AKP (along 
with control participants) was asked to justify his recognition memory responses and 
describe what in his experience led to the recognition judgment. AKP, like other 
participants could make appropriate use of the response categories (remember, 
familiar and guess), however AKP experienced false alarms as old items that had 
been studied. In particular it was concluded that on viewing a word at test AKP was 
confusing his reaction at test (the association AKP made to that word) as one he had 
had at study. At this time it is not possible to say whether this patient suffered from a 
recollection problem, as assumed by Conway, or from a lack of differential 
familiarity. That is a failure of familiarity may result in an overreliance on 
recollection and an inability to determine whether a reaction to the test item is or is 
not a memory from a prior experience with that item. As I indicated earlier, without 
familiarity, recollection may be inaccurate.   
Future Research 	  	   There are a number of questions and possibilities raised in the discussion that 
require further research. It has previously been pointed out that it is possible that 
acontextual familiarity in the form of recency may still be useful in the list specific 
task and further research may be necessary in order to clarify this. It has also been 
indicated that participants may confuse a reaction had at study with a prior reaction. It 
may be beneficial to run a study in which new items are added on the final test list as 
this would enable us to measure to what extent a reaction had at test may be confused 
with a reaction that may have occurred at study. If it was found that participants were 
incorrectly responding R to new items, then this would be difficult for Tulving’s 
(1983; 2005) theory to accommodate as this would indicate that when cues to a 
particular context are deficient, then autonoesis may not suffice. 
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Another avenue for future research might be to explore different 
manipulations of the RK procedure. This may help to clarify previous effects. For 
example, it may also be helpful to include a guess measure as the results of Gardiner 
et al., (1997) indicate that this may take the pressure off participants in choosing 
between a R and K judgment. It would be interesting to see if participants reduce the 
number of R judgments to a substantial degree (as they did in the justification 
condition of experiment 6 or if participants still report R, because they might still not 
realize the change between criterial and noncriterial information. If we found that R 
judgments decreased in number without affecting recognition performance then this 
may be a more reasonable method of obtaining RK judgments.  
Further to this, some more understanding about whether or not RK judgments 
are encouraging participants to recall content may be gained by asking for RK 
responses initially in a similar manner to Higham and Vokey (2004). Such a 
manipulation may more dramatically affect our results. In particular this may further 
clarify the proposal that participants are relying on recollection without familiarity in 
the final condition and learning to rely on recollection only in the presence of 
familiarity in the continuous condition. Introducing the RK paradigm initially may 
encourage participants to rely on recollection more, thus possibly negatively affecting 
performance in the continuous condition, and more greatly in the final condition. 
Such an experiment would involve four conditions, with all RK judgments made 
immediately. Half the participants would perform the task continuously or on the final 
list as they have previously, however the other half would make RK judgments 
initially without making a prior recognition judgment.  
In addition, it is possible that asking participants to justify their responses was 
unhelpful since we did not inform participants about criterial recollection. An 
improvement in recognition performance with the addition of the RK task might be 
observed if instructions ask participants to make R judgments only for criterial 
information. This might be quite similar to the RK instructions used by Yonelinas 
(2002). While more effortful, this is also focusing participants’ attention on more 
helpful information, so this may further clarify the previous proposal that effortful 
recollection may hinder performance only when noncriterial information is available. 
In Mather et al., (1997) they asked for very specific evidence of encoding attributes in 
the MCQ, in a sense asking for only criterial information would be synonymous to 
this. Of course, it may be that criterial information is simply not available to 
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participants – in this case, R judgments may decrease, similar to what was observed in 
the justification condition of experiment 6. However it is also possible that 
participants in the continuous condition may change the way they study the items in 
order to be able to attribute recollections to the occurrence of the test word in the last 
list. This relies on the assumption that the instructions are suggestive, however when 
performance is changed by such measures, then the role for suggestion would appear 
entirely likely. 
Other applications 
  Exploring the ‘butcher on the bus’ experience 
 Mandler’s (1980) ‘butcher on the bus’ example illustrated the experience of 
recognizing someone on the bus, while you may feel like you know the person you 
may not recollect anything about who that person is or where you know them from. 
Mandler (1980) indicated that a feeling of knowing the person might direct a search to 
possible contexts that you might be likely to know that person from, in his example 
this resulted in recognizing the man on the bus as a butcher. In this case, at first this 
might be considered a feeling of familiarity without recollection, which then might 
lead to recollection of a particular context. A majority of studies examining RK 
subjectivity have incorporated words as stimuli, however for the few that have 
deviated Gruppuso, Lindsay and Masson (2007) note that results tend to reflect that 
memory for faces are more likely to elicit K rather than R judgments.   
Gruppuso et al., (2007) explored whether or not switching contexts paired 
with faces would create a dissociation such that R responses were affected rather than 
K responses. Participants studied face-context pairs, with all faces and contexts 
unique, they were also required to rate the pairs in an orienting task in order to ensure 
deep encoding of the pairs. Context was created by pairing a picture of a face with a 
unique landscape such as building interiors or travel scenery. Participants were 
presented with eight unique study/test lists – including pairs of the following 
combinations: studied face/studied context, studied face/switched context; studied 
face/new context, new face/old context and new face/new context. Each pair type was 
presented at test and participants were told to make a judgment about the face only. R 
responses were more likely to be made when faces were tested with the context 
pictures they had been studied with, rather than with new or different contexts. Thus 
R responses were correlated with increased contextual information. 
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 In Gruppuso et al., (2007), individual and unique information was paired with 
faces which, of course, were also unique. The results of Gruppuso et al., (2007) 
indicated that R judgments could be induced if faces were viewed in similar contexts. 
I was curious as to what may happen to RK judgments if faces were presented instead 
of words in the list specific task. This task would test participants ability to identify 
‘what, where and when’ for faces that all become increasingly familiar over time. It 
might seem improbable that a R judgment would occur, however this may occur if 
participants try to rely on recollection with the introduction of the RK paradigm on 
the final trial. I undertook a small study with only 8 participants included in each 
condition and therefore it is difficult to conclude anything from such a study, however 
initial results are interesting. I selected 40 faces (controlling for gender (all were 
female), colour (gray-scale), size and attractiveness (all were previously rated as 
being of average attractiveness) to be included in the study, the design was the same 
as experiment 5 from the thesis (a practice trial was conducted initially). Again targets 
and distractors were randomized across four lists and participants either made RK 
judgments on every list (continuous) or on the final list. Performance across the lists 
on the recognition task was extremely consistent and quite good, despite participant’s 
insistence that they had not performed well on the task. While there was some 
increase in hits and false alarms across lists, this was marginal, but may indicate a 
reliance on familiarity.  
Potentially of more interest was the result of the RK manipulation. 
Interestingly, unlike previous studies, participants in the continuous condition were 
not necessarily more accurate, but rather, were more likely to say old and were more 
likely to accompany hits with a K response, not a R response – although this leveled 
out as they continued the task. However, in the final condition when participants 
made RK judgments on the final list they were more likely to respond R than K. It is 
further interesting to note that a decrement to performance was noted in the final 
condition on the last list compared to the continuous condition and that this correlated 
with an increase in R responses. Thus possibly participants were again trying to 
recollect content and therefore possibly relying on recollection in the absence of 
familiarity, resulting in poorer performance on the recognition task.  
Conclusion 
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It can be concluded that the addition of the RK task does not produce 
reasonable results when it is applied to multiple recognition lists where on each list a 
small set of items is randomly reassigned to be old and new items.  However, the 
issues observed may pose more general problems for the procedure. That is, 
participants did not notice the change from criterial to noncriterial information. 
Further to this, there is a possible learning process to the task, indicating that RK 
judgments may not always be a simple reflection of underlying processes. In addition 
the first time RK decisions are introduced, recognition performance can falter. At the 
very least, it would seem wise to be cautious in interpreting RK data, especially when 
there is an absence of converging evidence from another procedure.  
 Our results further raise some issues regarding the role of content recollection 
and familiarity in an episodic task. Content recollection was not helpful in our task, 
however it may be that there was a role for contextual familiarity which may have 
enabled participants to perform the task. I can not know this for certain until it can be 
understood how quickly acontextual familiarity might decay. Our results also indicate 
that recollection may not always be accurate if it is unaccompanied by familiarity and 
that with the addition of the RK task, participants may learn to report recollection 
only in the presence of familiarity. Furthermore I raised the possibility that 
participants may not be able to distinguish between their semantic reaction to a test 
item and a memory of having that reaction at study. All of these results taken together 
have implications for how episodic memory is viewed. That is our task is episodic, 
however this is not the same thing as saying that participants were tapping a unitary 
episodic memory system. These possibilities raise doubts about whether a principled 
definition of episodic memory is possible. 
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